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VI 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This matter is before the Court on this Court's Order Granting Petitioner's Petition 
for Certiorari to the Court of Appeals. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
This Court stated the issue in its Order Granting Petitioner's Petition for Certiorari 
as follows: 
Whether equitable estoppel may apply to modify the scope of an insurance 
policy's coverage where the scope of coverage is misstated by a company agent prior to 
the insured's purchase of the policy. 
More specifically to facts of the case, the issue can be otherwise stated as follows: 
Where unambiguous terms of a written insurance policy provide that underinsured 
motorist (UIM) coverage only covers an insured when the insured is in, entering or 
alighting from a motor vehicle, should a court expand that coverage, after an accident, to 
cover the insured as a pedestrian, merely because the insured orally alleges he was given 
some examples mentioning him as a pedestrian by an independent sales agent. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A party is entitled to summary judgment where there is no genuine issue of 
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Utah R. Civ. 
P. 56(c); First Amer. Title Ins. Co. v. IB. Ranch, Inc. 966 P.2d 834 (Utah 1998); Clover 
v. Snowbird Ski Resort, 808 P.2d 1037, 1039 (Utah 1991). Furthermore, "questions of 
contract interpretation not requiring resort to extrinsic evidence are matters of law, and on 
such questions, we accord the trial court's interpretation no presumption of correctness." 
1 
First Amer. Title Ins. Co. v. IB. Ranck Inc. 966 P.2d 834 (Utah 1998); Zions First Nat'l 
Bank v National Am. Title Ins. Co., 749 P.2d 651, 653 (Utah 1988) (citations omitted). 
See Record at 40 for Auto Owners Motion for Summary Judgment where the issue was 
preserved. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The respondent, (hereafter "Youngblood") sued petitioner, Auto Owners Insurance 
Company (hereafter uAuto Owners") for underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage for an 
accident in which he was a pedestrian. Youngblood's company purchased insurance from 
Auto Owners (hereafter the "Policy"). However, the UIM coverage in the Policy only 
applied if Youngblood was a passenger or operator in, on, or in the immediate act of 
entering or alighting from a motor vehicle. The lower court granted summary judgment 
to Auto Owners, based upon the unambiguous terms of the Policy. The Court of 
Appeals, in Youngblood v. Auto Owners Ins. Co., 2005 UT App 154, 111 P.3d 829, 
reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment, finding Auto Owners estopped 
from denying UIM coverage for Youngblood as a pedestrian. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
(The Undisputed Facts as to the Accident at Issue) 
1. On or about December 30, 1997, Youngblood was a pedestrian, walking across 
a parking lot toward a medical plaza when he was struck by an automobile (hereafter the 
•'Accident") driven by Rachel Louis Cooksey (hereafter the "Tortfeasor")- R. at 10-11 
(Amended Complaint, paras. 6, 8, 10 and 12); R. at 50-51(Pltf s depo. at 37-38). It is 
undisputed that he was a pedestrian at the time of the Accident. Id 
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2. Youngblood settled with the Tortfeasor for her policy limits. R. at 109-111. 
3. Youngblood alleges that his injuries exceeded the policy limits of the 
Tortfeasor's available insurance. R. at 11 (Amended Complaint, para. 12). 
(Lack of allegations of pre-accident acts supposedly justifying estoppel) 
4. In his complaint, Youngblood claimed that Auto Owners owes Youngblood 
underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage for injuries which exceeded the available 
insurance of the Tortfeasor. R. at 11-12 (Amended Complaint, paras. 14, 12, and 16). 
5. Youngblood's Amended Complaint contains no allegation that he was induced 
to enter into the insurance contract by pre-policy representations of a sale's agent which 
might estop Auto Owners should be estopped from denying coverage. R. at 10-14 (entire 
Amended Complaint). Youngblood does allege, however, that Auto-Owners should be 
estopped from denying UIM pedestrian coverage, however, the only allegations in 
support of estoppel are that Auto Owners took actions after the accident, not before, 
indicating at first that there may be coverage, but later denying coverage. R. at 12 
(Amended Complaint, para. 15). 
6. Although Estoppel is not claimed in Youngblood's Amended Complaint 
regarding the pre-policy statements of any sales agent, in his deposition he alleges that an 
independent sales agent made certain statements to him regarding pedestrians or non-
motorists before he purchased the policy. See the following paragraphs. 
7. Youngblood states in his deposition, but not in his Amended Complaint, that he 
purchased the Policy at issue through a Mark, last name not remembered by Youngblood, 
n J 
who was an employee of Cottonwood Insurance, not an employee of Auto Owners. R, at 
96 (Pltfs depo. At 103:11-13). 
8. Youngblood states that the Cottonwood Insurance agent stated the following: 
"But he said, wHey, underinsured and uninsured, the reason you have 
these is you have to protect your family/ And he said, 'what if 
you're walking down the street? Without these' - what do you call 
them? -'without these riders' - 1 think that's what they call them. 
He said, w Without these riders, you know, you've got nothing.' 
Now, he said, The only thing that I would recommend, other than 
this, if you don't get this, is to get some kind of wage protection.' 
R. at 96-97 (Pltfs depo. at 103:25 to 104:9). 
9. Youngblood continued, regarding the Cottonwood Insurance agent: 
A. "Well, Mark said, and I quote, 'Hey, if you're walking down the 
street, you've got nothing if you have - if you don't have 
underinsured and uninsured motorist and somebody runs you over,' 
and I chuckled. I thought that was kind of lame. Actually, I thought 
it was kind of lame because I could never picture me walking down 
the street and somebody running over me." 
R. at 97-98 (Pltfs depo. at 104:21 to 105: 2). 
10. Youngblood even said the Cottonwood Insurance agent mentioned coverage if 
Youngblood is sitting at his desk; Youngblood appears to equate that with underinsured 
motorist coverage, as if a car might hit him at his desk, which does not make sense: 
"[Mark said], "Hey, you could be walking - you could be sitting at 
your desk or walking down the street' - that's a quote. vYou could 
be sitting at your desk or walking the street and if you don't have the 
coverage, you've got nothing.' 
R. at 98-99. (Pltfs depo. at 105:11-15). 
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11. Youngblood said that the example of walking down the street was "lame," 
thereby appearing to imply that it was not reasonable or believable. R. at 97 (para. 9, 
above). 
12. Youngblood was then asked if he relied on the example of walking down the 
street or sitting at his desk. Although he said, "Well, yes," he went on to indicate he 
really wanted coverage as a motorist: 
Q. "Did you rely on that statement [the statement in the immediately 
preceding quote] in part in purchasing this insurance: 
A. Well, yes. These guys [Mark and his brother], I figured, were not 
only selling a lot of insurance and knew what they were doing, but I 
guess that truth is that I knew a lot of guys didn't have insurance and 
I knew that 1 drove some nice vehicles. And if somebody were to 
slam into one of my cars...That's what I pictured." 
R. at 98 (Pltf s depo. at 105:16-24). 
13. The above facts regarding the alleged conversation with the insurance agent 
from Cottonwood Insurance are denied by Auto Owners, but Auto Owners admits, for 
purposes of this appeal only, that such are the facts in a light more favorable to 
Youngblood. 
(The Undisputed Facts as to the Lack of Coverage Under the Policy for 
Accidents wherein the Respondent is a Pedestrian) 
14. Auto Owners wrote an insurance policy to Youngblood Home Improvement, 
Inc., not to Youngblood individually (hereafter the "Policy"). R. at 10-11 (Amended 
Complaint, para. 8),Addendum at 14, 15, and 16. 
15. Youngblood was an officer and owner of the insured, Youngblood Home 
Improvement, Inc. R. at 10 (Amended Complaint, para, 7). 
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16. The Policy covered certain specifically designated motor vehicles, and UIM 
coverage if those vehicles were involved in an accident with an underinsured motorist. 
See the following paragraphs. 
17. The UIM coverage at issue in the Policy only covers insureds who are 
"occupying" one of the vehicles specifically identified in the policy. The underinsured 
coverage in the Policy unambiguously states: 
"2.a. We will pay compensatory damages any person is legally 
entitled to recover: 
(1) from the owner or operator of an underinsured 
automobile; 
(2) for bodily injury sustained while occupying an 
automobile that is covered by SECTION II-LIABILITY 
COVERAGE of the policy." 
R. at 61 (the Policy - Bold and all caps in the original); Addendum at 35. 
18. The words "occupying" and "automobile," in the immediately preceding 
quote with regard to underinsured motorist coverage are defined terms in the Policy. The 
word "occupying" is defined as follows: 
"1 . Definitions. The following definitions apply in addition to those 
contained in SECTION I-DEFINITIONS of the policy. 
A. Occupying means being in or on an automobile as a passenger 
or operator, or being engaged in the immediate acts of entering, 
boarding or alighting from an automobile. 
R. at 60 (the Policy - Bold and caps in the original); Addendum at 34. 
19. Thus, in order to be covered under the UIM coverage under the Policy, the 
injury must be sustained while the injured party is "occupying an automobile" which 
means being "in or on an automobile as a passenger or operator or being engaged in the 
6 
immediate acts of entering, boarding or alighting from an automobile." Para. 18, above. 
(Emphasis added). 
20. Youngblood received a copy of the Policy before the Accident. R. at 103 
(Pltf s depo. at 117:9-15). 
21. The cover sheet to the Policy is entitled UA Quick Guide to you Policy" and 
states at the top: 
READ YOUR POLICY CAREFULLY. This cover sheet provides only a 
brief outline of some of the important features of your policy. This is not 
the insurance contract and only the actual policy provisions will control. 
The policy itself sets forth, in detail, the rights and obligations of both you 
and your insurance company. IT IS THEREFORE IMPORTANT 
THAT YOU READ YOUR POLICY. 
Addendum at 17. 
22. Although he had received a copy of the Policy, Youngblood did not see that 
the UIM coverage under the Policy covered him when he was a motorist, but not when he 
was doing other things such as walking, sitting at his desk, etc. R. at 105 (para. 3). 
23. The Policy did state that if the named insured was "an individual" then 
pedestrian coverage would exist: 
b. If the first named insured in the Declarations is an individual this 
coverage is extended as follows: 
(1) We will pay damages you are legally entitled to recover: 
(a) From the owner of operator of any Underinsured 
Automobile 
(b) For bodily injury you sustain: 
1) When you are a pedestrian. 
R. at 61, and 63 (Pltf s Memo, at para. 4) (bold in the original, underlining added); 
Addendum at 35. 
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24. However, the first named insured in the Policy is Youngblood Home 
Improvement, Inc., not an individual. R. at 64, para. 1 (Respondent's Statement of 
Facts). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
In his amended complaint, Youngblood did not allege that any representations 
prior to his purchase of the policy should estop Auto-Owners from denying the UIM 
pedestrian coverage which did not exist in the Policy. Therefore, the Court of Appeals 
should not have found estoppel based on pre-purchase statements. 
Any pre-policy sales representations were made by an independent agent from 
Cottonwood Insurance, not an agent or employee of Auto-Owners, therefore Auto-
Owners should not be estopped by any such statements. Under Utah law, each party 
should be responsible only for that party's own fault, and not for the fault of others 
including independent contractors. 
This Court, a prior panel of the court of appeals, and the majority of the states 
support the general position that estoppel may not be used to expand coverage beyond 
that which is provided by written contract in a policy. Sound policy reasons support this 
position including, (1) claims of additional coverage are too easily made by someone 
trying to recover money, (2) the insurer never received a premium for such expanded 
coverage, (3) the insurer did not take such risks into account in determining its total risks, 
(4) a written document is the best and most reliable evidence of a contract. See also the 
next paragraph on parole evidence. 
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Under long-standing principles, parole evidence should not be used to vary the 
terms of a written contract, including an insurance policy, unless there is an ambiguity 
requiring clarification. With respect to an ambiguity in an insurance policy, there is still 
no need for parole evidence because any ambiguity will merely be resolved in favor of 
coverage. In the present Policy, there is no ambiguity. 
Youngbiood received a copy of the very understandable Policy, and should held to 
a duty to read it; otherwise reliance on pre-policy statements is not reasonable. 
The pre-policy statements by the Cottonwood Insurance agent were not promises 
of coverage, but mention of accidents when someone is walking down the street or sitting 
at his desk. Youngbiood thought them "lame," desiring coverage for his company's cars. 
When asked if he relied on the "lame" examples he questionable stated that he did. Thus 
any reliance is unreasonable. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 
YOUNGBLOOD DID NOT ALLEGE IN HIS AMENDED COMPLAINT THAT 
ANY PRE-POLICY REPRESENTATIONS JUSTIFIED ESTOPPING AUTO-
OWNERS FROM DENYING UIM COVERAGE. 
In his Amended Complaint, Youngbiood did not allege that any pre-Policy 
representations were made by a sales agent at all, let alone that he relied on any such 
representations to his detriment, nor that Auto-owners should be estopped from denying 
coverage in the Policy as a result of any such pre-Policy representations. See Facts, above, paras. 
5-6. As grounds for relief, Youngbiood does allege that well after the accident, Auto Owners at 
first indicated there may be coverage, but later denied it. Facts, above, para. 5. Youngbiood first 
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mentions pre-policy statements, representations by the Cottonwood sales agent, in his deposition, 
but not in his Amended Complaint. Facts, above, paras. 5-6 
The only mention of estoppel in the Amended Complaint is in paragraph 15 thereof (R. at 
12 and 57) wherein only post-accident representations are asserted as grounds for estoppel. 
Facts, above, para. 5. 
Because the Amended Complaint does not allege any representations prior to the 
purchase of the insurance as grounds for estoppel, this court should not consider pre-Policy 
representations as grounds for estoppel, as the Court of Appeals erroneously did. 
POINT II 
AN INDEPENDENT INSURANCE AGENCY SHOULD NOT BE ABLE 
TO CREATE UNEXPECTED, UNINTENDED COVERAGE FOR AN 
INSURER; WHERE AN INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR/SALES 
AGENT MAKES REPRESENTATIONS AS TO WHAT A FUTURE 
POLICY MAY COVER, THAT AGENT/AGENCY, IF ANYONE, 
SHOULD BE LIABLE, NOT THE INSURER. 
In 1986, the Utah legislature did away with joint and several liability in favor of 
the more equitable and fair doctrine that each party should be liable only for that party's 
own percentage of fault, and not for the fault of others. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-40 
states: 
"Subject to section 78-27-38, the maximum amount for which a 
defendant may be liable to any person seeking recovery is that 
percentage or proportion of the damages equivalent to the percentage 
or proportion of fault attributed to that defendant." 
See also cases interpreting and upholding that section of the code. 
In the present case, the sales agent, who allegedly made pre-Policy statements 
relating to persons walking down the street or sitting at a desk, was an independent agent 
10 
working for Cottonwood Insurance Agency. See Facts, above, paras. 7-12 . If this court 
should determine that there should some form of liability for pre-Policy statements made, 
then the liability should be that of the independent contractor sales agency, and not the 
insurer. Such liability could be in the form of some type of malpractice or other fault. 
However the insurer, which was not a party to such statements or representations, and in 
good faith, accepted a premium based upon coverage only for certain expected risks, 
should not be at fault, and not be through estopped to deny coverage. Unintended 
coverage for totally unexpected risks, outside the insurance contract, should not be 
imposed on the insurer based upon actions of an independent contractor. That would be 
contrary to the letter and spirit of the Utah statutes on fault, and the related case law 
supporting those statutes. 
An independent insurance agency is just that, independent. The insurer cannot 
control such an agency, except to the extent the insurer may not let that agency sell the 
insurer's policies any more, after demonstration of some bad faith. The insurer doesn't 
control the specific representations made. The insurer can only create the policy and 
warn the prospective insured to read it carefully, as was done in this case. The 
independent agent should not be able to create coverage which is not expected or 
intended by the insurer, whether through alame" examples not relied upon (Facts, above, 
paras. 9-11, or reasonable appearing promises relied upon. Even if, somehow, this Court 
might feel that an employee of the insurer might be able to create coverage which does 
not exist in the policy, through estoppel, such are not the facts of this case, and such a 
holding should await another day. No employee of the insurer was involved in the pre-
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Policy sales representations regarding the future Policy at issue. See also Point VI, 
below, discussing the Harr case. 
POINT III 
UNDER PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT INTERPRETATION, AS A 
MATTER OF LAW, NO UNDERINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE 
WAS AVAILABLE TO YOUNGBLOOD AS A NON-MOTORIST 
UNDER THE POLICY. 
Contract interpretation is a matter of law. For decades, the Courts in Utah have 
held that contract interpretation is a matter of law, not fact. See, for example, Saunders v. 
Sharp, 806 P.2d 198, 200 (Utah 1991) ("Interpretation of a contract is a matter of law for 
the court to determine, unless the contract is ambiguous and evidence of the parties' 
intent... is necessary to establish the terms of the contract"). Whether an ambiguity 
exists is likewise a matter of law. See Willard Pease Oil & Gas Co., v. Pioneer Oil & 
Gas Co. 899 P. 2d. 766, 770 (Utah 1995). 
Insurance contracts are no different. Insurance contracts are the same as other 
contracts and should likewise be interpreted as a matter of law. See Utah Farm Bureau 
Ins. Co. v. Crook, 1999 UT 47, P5; Alfv. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 850 P. 2d. 1272 
(Utah. 1993); Prince v. Bear River Mut. Ins. Co., 2002 UT 68 wherein the court stated, ". 
. . [BJecause an insurance policy is the contract between the insurer and the insured, we 
first look to the plain language of the policy to ascertain its meaning if it is not 
ambiguous. Id. at Holmes Dev, LLC v. Cook, 2002 UT 38, P24, 48 P.3d 895; Miller v. 
USAA, Cas. Ins. Co., 2002 Ut 6, P49, 44 P.3d 663." Id. at P21. In Holmes Dev., LLC v. 
Cook,, above, this Court stated: 
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"a title insurance policy like other insurance policies, serves as a 
contract between the insurer and the insured, and as such 4is subject 
to the general rules of contract construction.' Miller v. USAA Cas. 
Ins. Co., . . . [above] (quoting S. W. Energy Corp v. Cont'l Ins. Co., 
199 UT. 23, p!2, 974 P.2d 1239; Accord First Am. Title Insurance 
Co. v. JB Ranch, Inc., 966 P.2d 834, 836 (Utah 1998)." 
Id. at P24. Thus, interpretation of an insurance contract is the same as interpretation of 
other contracts. See also Alfv. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 850 P.2d 1272, 1274 (Utah 
1993); ("An insurance policy is merely a contract between the insured and the insurer and 
is construed pursuant to the same rules applied to ordinary contracts."). The court of 
appeals has followed this precedent and held the same. See Village Inn Apartments v. 
State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 790 P.2d 581, 582 (Utah App. 1990), ("Insurance policies 
are merely contracts and should thus be interpreted under the same rules governing 
ordinary contracts."). 
Contracts are interpreted using their plain meaning and giving effect to all words. 
In interpretation of an insurance contract, as any other contract, the commonly accepted 
meanings of words are considered, and a contract is read as a whole in an attempt to 
harmonize and give affect to all of the contract provisions. See Nielsen v. O'Riley, 848 
P,2d 664, 665 (Utah 1992) ("The terms of insurance contracts . . . are to be interpreted in 
a court with their usual meanings and should be read as a whole, in an attempt to 
harmonize and give affect to all of the contract provisions.") 
Parole evidence will not be used to vary the terms of an insurance contract. In 
Braughon v. CUNA Mutual Ins. Co., Ill P.2d 1105 (Utah App. 1989) this Court stated, 
"if a policy of insurance is clear and unambiguous, the words are to be taken and 
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understood in their plain ordinary and popular sense as an average or reasonable person 
with ordinary understanding would construe them." Id. at 1108, quoting Clark v 
Prudential Ins. Co., 204 Kan. 487, 464 P.2d 253, 257 (1970). In the case of insurance 
contracts, instead of the use of parole evidence to vary the contract, where there is an 
ambiguity, the ambiguity will merely be resolved in favor of coverage rather than 
requiring parole evidence. See American Casualty Co. v. Eagle Star Ins. Co., Ltd, 568 
P.2d 731 (Utah 1977), wherein the court stated, uIf an insurance policy is ambiguous or 
uncertain, so that it is fairly susceptible to different interpretations, any doubt should be 
resolved in favor of insurance coverage". Id. at 734, cited favorably in Perkins, below, 
814 P.2d 1129 (Utah App. 1991). Thus where a contract of insurance is concerned one 
doesn't get to parole evidence. If there is no ambiguity, no parole evidence will be 
allowed. If there is an ambiguity, it is resolved in favor of coverage. Therefore, no 
parole evidence is needed or allowed. 
Unambiguous lack of UIM pedestrian coverage in the Policy when the insured is 
not a motorist. In the present case, it is undisputed that the Policy, clearly and 
unequivocally, without any ambiguity, states that insureds are covered only when they 
are ^occupying an automobile." See Facts, above, paras. 17-18. The term "occupying" 
an automobile is clearly and without ambiguity defined as "being in or on an automobile" 
or " being engaged in the immediate acts of entering, boarding or alighting from an 
automobile." See Facts, above, paragraph 18. 
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In the present case, it is undisputed, that Youngblood was a pedestrian at the time 
of the Accident at issue, and was not in or on an automobile, nor in the immediate act of 
entering, boarding or alighting from an automobile. See Facts, above, para. 1. 
Because it is undisputed that the appellant was a pedestrian, and because it is 
undisputed that the insurance Policy at issue does not cover pedestrians, there is no UIM 
coverage under the Policy and Auto Owners was entitled to the summary judgment 
granted by the trial court. 
The Policy, in clear, simple language, states that coverage is only extended to 
pedestrians, if the named insured is an individual, not a corporation or other legal entity. 
Facts, above, para. 23. The Policy was a business policy issued to Youngblood Home 
Improvement, Inc., not to an individual. Facts, above, para. 24. There is no ambiguity 
which would require parole evidence for clarification. 
POINT IV 
ESTOPPEL SHOULD NOT BE EMPLOYED TO CREATE COVERAGE 
WHERE NONE EXTSTED, WHICH COVERAGE THE INSURER DID 
NOT INTEND, EXPECT OR PROVIDE FOR. 
Admittedly there is a split in authority among the state courts concerning whether 
estoppel can create coverage where none was intended or expected. An ALR report, 1 
A.L.R.3d 1139, which includes cases as recent as 2004 (See cases at 1 A.L.R.3d 1139, 
para. 3) states: 
While waiver and estoppel have been held applicable to nearly every area 
in which an insurer may deny liability, the courts of most jurisdictions 
agree that these concepts are not available to broaden the coverage of a 
policy so as to protect the insured against risks not included therein or 
expressly excluded therefrom. 
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Id. at § 2. (Emphasis added). The report continued: 
It is a rule of general application in most jurisdictions that the doctrines of 
waiver and estoppel are not available to bring within the coverage of an 
insurance policy risks not covered by its terms, or expressly excluded 
therefrom. 
Id. at § 3. (Emphasis added). The report does admit that, "The contrary view, however, is 
represented in the decisions from some jurisdictions, . . ." Id. at § 2. 
Utah cases. This honorable Court has not decided the precise issue here. 
However, in Alfv. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 850 P. 2d. 1272 (Utah. 1993), this 
Court was faced with a very similar argument that an insured had certain reasonable 
expectations with regard to an insurance policy, which expectations were not included in 
the policy language itself. This court stated that it must enforce an unambiguous 
insurance contract, and "In general, a court may not rewrite an insurance contract for the 
parties if the language is clear and unambiguous." Id. at 1275, quoted also in Utah Farm 
Bureau Ins. Co. v. Crook, 1999 UT. 47, P6. 
In Perkins v. Great-West Life Assurance Company, et al, 814 P.2d 1125 (Utah 
App. 1991), a different panel of the court: of appeals from the panel deciding this case 
below, faced an argument that is almost identical to the argument of the Appellant in the 
case at bar, that is, as a result of equitable estoppel, the plaintiff should be able to obtain 
coverage for which he had never paid a premium, and which was never intended or 
expected by the insurer, and was not provided in the insurance contract. That panel made 
quick work of that argument by finding that not only Utah, but the great majority of states 
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will not allow insurance coverage to be increased or expanded beyond that which appears 
in the policy of insurance, through the doctrine of estoppel. The court stated: 
"The great majority of states dealing with the doctrine of estoppel 
have held that it cannot be used to bring risks which were not 
covered by the terms of the policy within coverage of the policy. 
See e.g., Farmers Ins. Co. v. Zumsteim, 138 Ariz. 469, 675 P.2d 729 
(Ariz. App. 1983); Topeka Tent and Awning Co. v. Glen Falls Ins. 
Co., 13 Kan. App. 2d 553, 774 P.2d 984 (1989); Boyer Metal Fab. 
Inc. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 90 Or. App. 103, 750 P.2d 1195, 
review denied, 305 Or 672, 757 P.2d 422 (1988); St. Paul Fire and 
Maurine Ins. Co. v. Albany County Dis. No. 7, 763 P.2d 1255 (Wyo. 
1988). 
Id. at 1131 (Emphasis added). 
The general law of estoppel also demonstrates the lack of applicability thereof to 
facts such as those asserted by Youngblood. For example, in Ravarino v. Price, 260 P.2d 
570 (Utah 1953), quoted with approval by this Court as recently as 1999 in Numley v. 
Westates Casing Servs. Inc., 1999 UT 100, this Court declared that the doctrine of 
equitable estoppel only applies where the alleged representations are as to past or present, 
not future facts. For example, the court stated, "generally, the doctrine of equitable 
estoppel is applicable only when a misrepresentation is made as to past or present facts; . 
. ." Id. at 557 (Emphasis added). In the present case, the plaintiff asserts that an 
independent agent made statements which might, at best, apply in the future. See Facts, 
above, paras. 7-12. 
Representations as to the future has application, but a narrow application not 
applicable to the facts in the case. The quote from Ravarino, in the immediately 
preceding paragraph, goes on to state, ". . .[A]n exception is recognized when a 
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misrepresentation as to the future operates as an abandonment of an existing right of the 
party making the misrepresentation." Ravarino, above, at 575. The court then analyzed 
several cases finding: 
"the common element in these cases is that the promise as to future 
conduct constitutes a manifestation that the promisor will abandon 
an existing right which he possesses. It is apparent that an attempt to 
apply this doctrine to the oral promise of Mr. Price . . . is factually 
impossible unless the phrase is to be distorted beyond meaning." 
Id. at 575. A legal waiver under Utah law, which is necessary for estoppel arising out of 
representations as to future facts, is very difficult to establish. A waiver must be a very 
direct, clear expression that a party is aware of a known right and specifically intends to 
waive that right. In US Realty 86 Assocs. v. Security Inv. Ltd., 2002 UT. 14, this court 
stated: 
"The legal standard necessary to find waiver is clear. 'Waiver is the 
intentional relinquishment of a known right. To constitute waiver, 
there must be an existing right, benefit or advantage, a knowledge of 
its existence, and an intention to relinquish it.' Soter's, Inc. v. 
DeseretFed Savs. & Loan Ass % 857 P.2d 935, 942 (Utah 1993) 
quoting Phoenix, Inc. v. Health, 90 Utah 187, 194, 61 P.2d 308, 211-
12(1936))". 
Id. at PI6. This Court went on to indicate that courts must be "especially careful" with 
regard to questions of waiver "especially where such waiver is merely implied." Id. 
Cases from other jurisdictions. Besides the jurisdictions and cases cited by the 
Court of Appeals in Perkins, quoted above, many other cases hold that estoppel cannot be 
used to expand coverage in a written policy. The Court of Appeals in the decision below, 
Youngblood v. Auto Owners, 2005 UT App 154, P 16, (See Addendum to this brief) cited 
three cases on point which hold that estoppel may not be used to expand an insurance 
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policy's coverage to risks not covered by its terms or risks expressly excluded from 
coverage: Nicholls v. Zurich Am. Ins. Group, 244 F.Supp. 2d 1144, 1157 (D. Colo. 
2003); Harasyn v. St. Paul Guardian Ins. Co. 75 S.W.3d 696, 702 (Ark. 2002); and 
Ouillian v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 6 S.E.2d 108, 112 (Ga. Ct. App. 1939). In 
addition to these cases, the following are illustrative. 
In Royal Maccabees Life Insurance Company v. James, 146 S.W. 3d 340 (Tex. 
Oct. 2004), the court stated: 
Under Texas law, it has long been established that waiver and 
estoppel cannot be used to create insurance coverage . . . waiver and 
estoppel cannot enlarge the risks covered by a policy and cannot be 
used to create a new and different contract with respect to the risk 
covered and the insurance extended. 
Id. at 350, citing to prior precedent. The court used principles of contact interpretation to 
resolve the case, similar to the approach under Point III, above, resolving ambiguities in 
favor of the insured. 
In St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Albany Co. Sch. Dist No. 7, 763 P.2d 1255 
(Wyo. 1988), the insured claimed uan alleged misrepresentation of policy coverage by 
Motis," who iwhad arranged the purchases and renewals of the policies . . . " Id. at 1257. 
The court cited precedent that, "It has been broadly stated that the doctrines of waiver and 
estoppel cannot be used to extend coverage of an insurance policy or create a primary 
liability . . . Under no conditions can the coverage or restrictions on coverage be extended 
by waiver or estoppel." Id. at 1261. The court cited other precedents, concluding that, 
%t[T]he coverage afforded by the policy cannot be expanded by estoppel or waiver on the 
basis of the representations of Motis." Id. at 1262. 
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In Allied Mutual Ins. Co. v. Moeder, 48 P.3d 1 (Kan. App. 2002), the court 
determined that policy language was not ambiguous which stated there would be no 
coverage unless all of the insured's vehicles were insured by the insurer. The insurer 
discovered that the plaintiff owned a large Kenworth truck not insured with them, and 
denied coverage. The plaintiff then alleged that his agent 'told him it was not capable on 
providing such coverage [for the Kenworth truck]," therefore the insurer should be 
estopped from asserting lack of coverage for his not insuring the Kenworth with the 
insurer. In spite of such pre-policy representations, the court stated, "Kansas cases hold 
that waiver and estoppel cannot be used to expand coverage of an insurance policy where 
the policy unambiguously excludes coverage of the insured's claim [citations omitted]." 
Id. at 5. The court continued, "Since the insurance policy unambiguously excludes 
coverage of the claim made in this case, Moeder [the insured] may not invoke the 
principles of waiver and estoppel." Id. at 5. 
In Wysong and Miles Co. v Employers ofWausau, et al, 4 F. Supp. 2d 421 
(M.D.N.C. 1998), the court stated the following, applying North Carolina law, 
"Assuming that Wysong could establish all of the elements of an estoppel claim, this 
Court should not rewrite Wysong's policies to extend coverage to risks that the policies 
did not cover by their terms." Id. at 432. The court held that the rule "prevents courts 
from rewriting insurance policies and thereby obligating insurance companies to pay for 
losses for which they did not charge a premium, [citation omitted]." Id. at 432. 
In Western Casualty and Surety Co. v. Sliter, 555 F.Supp. 269 (E.D. Mich. 1983), 
concerning pre-purchase representations, the court stated: 
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"The law in Michigan is that an insurer 'is not liable on erroneous 
representations by an agent as to the extent of coverage of a plainly 
worded policy, so as to entitle the insured to equitable relief, even 
though the latter failed to read the instrument.' The policy should not 
and will not be reformed by this Court to provide for coverage not 
agreed to by the insurer." 
Id. at 371. 
In Parris & Son, Inc. v. Campbell, 196 S.E.2d 334 (Ga. 1973), concerning 
representations as to the extent of coverage prior to and after the purchase of the 
insurance, the court found such representation to be opinion, compared to the language of 
the policy itself. The court stated, "Nor does the expression of an opinion as to coverage 
work an estoppel — even against the agent who voiced it, or against his principal," citing 
prior Georgia law. Id. at 338. See Hartford, the 1992 Georgia case mentioned under Point 
V, below. 
In Reinsurance Assoc, of Minn. v. Timmer, 641 N.W.2d 302 (Minn. 2002), facing 
pre-policy representations by the insurer's agent, the court stated, "RAM [the insurer] 
correctly notes that estoppel cannot be used to enlarge the coverage of an insurance 
policy. See Shannon v. Great Am. Ins. Co. 276 N.W.2d 77, 78 (Minn. 1979)". Id. at 310-
311. 
In Zarella v. Minn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. 824 A.2d 1249 (R.I. 2003), the insured 
complained of impressions left by the sales agent that the total cash value of a policy was 
contingent on the annual dividend and if the policy is surrendered between anniversary 
dates the insured will receive a pro rata share of the annual dividend. After discussing the 
elements of estoppel, the court stated: 
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The court, however, may not invoke the doctrine of equitable 
estoppel to expand the scope of coverage of an insurance policy, 
[citation omitted]. Additionally, quasi-contractual remedies such as 
equitable estoppel are inapplicable when the parties are bound by an 
express contract. See JNExploration & Production v. Western Gas 
Resources, Inc. 153 F.3d 906, 910 (8th Cir. 1998) (interpreting North 
Dakota law); Hodgkins v. New England Telephone Co. 82 F.3d 
1226, 1232 (Tsl Cir. 1996) (interpreting Maine law); Cloverdale 
Equipment Co v. Simon Aerials, Inc., 869 F.2d 934, 939 (6th Cir. 
1989) (interpreting Michigan law); Hershey Foods Corp. v. Ralph 
Chapek, Inc. 828 F. 2d 989, 999 (3d Cir. 1987) (interpreting 
Pennsylvania law)." 
Id. at 1260 (Emphasis added). 
See also United Capitol Ins. Co. v. Kapiloff 155 P.3d 488, 497 (4th Cir. 1988) 
(applying Maryland law that "waiver or estoppel may occur only when it does not create 
new coverage; extension of coverage may only be created by a new contract."); Pace v. 
Fin. Sec. Life of Miss., 608 So. 2d 1135, 1149 (Miss. 1992) (the doctrines of waiver and 
estoppel may not operate to create coverage or expand existing coverage to risks which, 
by the terms of the policy, are expressly excluded.) 
In addition, see the cases under Point V, below denying estoppel for the reason 
that the insured has a duty to read the policy. 
Policy reasons for the majority rule. There are several policy reasons why other 
jurisdictions have, and this court should, hold that estoppel cannot expand coverage 
beyond the terms of the policy and the risks expected and intended to be covered. Those 
policy reasons include the following. 
Contracts are agreements among parties which the courts should not re-write for 
one of the parties, through estoppel. The unambiguous provisions of a contract should not 
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be altered by parole evidence. See Point III, above, and this Court's quote from Alf, 
above, that the courts, "may not rewrite an insurance contract.v Alfat 1275. 
Allegations after an accident, to try to recover monies from a deep pocket such as 
an insurance company, can be too easily made, and disproved with too much difficulty. 
A fact finder could be sympathetic to an injured party and lean in that party's favor, in the 
face of denials by the sale's agent. A ruling allowing such estoppel, could encourage the 
easy act of asserting estoppel to create new coverage by merely alleging representations 
of non-existent coverage. 
Where there is a writing that should control. A writing is far more reliable than 
the oral allegations of a person seeking to gain money by asserting coverage not in the 
existing written policy. 
When the insured has been provided a copy of the policy, she has the means to 
determine the truth rather than allegedly relying on supposed oral statements which may 
not have existed or may have been misconstrued. 
Representations of future facts would only be opinion of what may occur and 
should not be reasonably relied upon. See this Court's Numley case, above. 
No premium has been paid for the expanded coverage and the risks of loss not 
taken into account calculated. To obtain insurance coverage, a party pays a specific 
premium for a specific risk or coverage. Premiums are set by actuaries to cover expected 
claims by ail insureds based upon expected statistics. If estoppel could create coverage 
not expected or intended by the insurer, no premium was paid, and therefore the risk is 
not covered by paid-in funds. The actuarial applecart is overturned. That would certainly 
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be the case if more people were encouraged to assert coverage for risks not in the 
insurance policy if estoppel is held to create unexpected coverage. 
More than the lack of one premium, the unexpected risk itself could be vastly 
greater than any corresponding premium. The premium may be small in comparison to 
the insurance coverage sought by way of estoppel. The liability to an insurer could be in 
the hundreds of thousands or even the millions of dollars if parties could assert estoppel 
to obtain unexpected and unintended coverage. The actuarial applecart is really upset. 
One might argue that an insurance company should be able to shoulder additional, 
unexpected huge risks, however even if that may be the case with some very solvent 
insurers, covering large, unexpected risks might cause the demise of other insurers. 
Insurers and their actuaries should be able to assess their potential risks, and rely on those 
assessments without having them turned upside down by unexpected and unintended 
claims through estoppel. 
As is the case in the present matter, an insurer should not suffer where an 
independent contracting sales agent is alleged to have made pre-contract representations 
inconsistent with the policy written by the insurer. See Point II, above. An insurer 
should only be liable for its own fault, and not that of an independent insurance sales 
agency, even if pre-policy representations could be actionable. 
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POINT V 
ESTOPPEL SHOULD NOT APLY WHERE THE INSURED RECEIVES 
A COPY OF THE POLICY AND HAS OPPORTUNITY TO READ IT 
AND DETERMINE THE COVERAGES THEREIN. 
In Perkins, above, the Court of Appeals stated that representations are not 
reasonably relied upon when one has the means to ascertain the actual content of the 
insurance policy, or the actual truth. The court stated, quoting from two prior cases from 
this Court: 
"'A party claiming an estoppel cannot rely on representations or acts 
if they are contrary to his knowledge of the truth or if he had the 
means by which with reasonable diligence he could ascertain the 
truth/ Larson v. Wycoff Co., 624 P.2d 1151, 1155 (Utah 1981) 
(citing Coombs v. Ouzounian, 24 Utah 2d 39, 465 P.2d 356 (1970)). 
Id. at 1130. (Emphasis added). The court continued by stating that, "Mrs. Perkins had 
the means by which she could have ascertained the contents of Great-West's policy." Id. 
The court then stated that, "given Mrs. Perkins' failure to learn the terms of her insurance 
policy, her reliance thereon [or alleged representations] was not reasonable." Id. 
(Emphasis added). 
Auto Owners must admit that this Court, in a three to two split decision, has 
applied estoppel to insurance contracts, but only in a very narrow context, where the 
insurance company failed or refused to provide a copy of the policy to its insured: the 
insured could not read and verify coverage. In General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. 
Martinez, 668 P.2d 498 (Utah 1983) (hereafter Martinez), the majority decision held, 
^that an insurance company is estopped from relying upon an exclusion in a policy if the 
company has failed to deliver the policy or certificate of insurance to the insured, or any 
other document stating the exclusion." Id. at 501. The above language of the majority 
seems to state that if there were any possibility that the insured could see the exclusion or 
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a representation of the exclusion, not even the policy, such as "a certificate of insurance 
or any other document stating the exclusion" the majority would not even apply estoppel 
in such case. 
The dissent in Martinez, by two justices would not even apply estoppel under the 
facts of that case, stating, "The majority's decision injects a new provision into insurance 
contracts, a provision whose effects are almost impossible to gauge. . . ." Id. at 502-503. 
The dissent continued, 'The potential effects of the majority's decision are even more 
far-reaching . . . the majority's holding suggests that an insured who can convince a jury 
that he had not received a copy of the policy might enforce this policy without regard to it 
provisions . . ."Id. at 503. 
Cases from other jurisdiction declare that an insured has an obligation to read the 
policy of insurance. As an example, in Hunton v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America 243 
F.Supp.2d 686 (S.D. Texas 2001), the plaintiff alleged he bought a life policy which 
would only require premium payments for a fixed number of years, and the sales agent 
represented that the policy would so provide. Although the insured claimed 
misrepresentation, the court held that under Texas law, "an insured has a duty to read the 
insurance policy and is charged with knowledge of its provisions." Id at 706. The court 
held that, "Friedman's [the sales agent's] oral representations cannot as a mater of law 
override the written contract terms." Id. at 707. Even with respect to a claim of 
fraudulent inducement, the court held, "Nevertheless, even a cursory review of the Policy 
and Application informs Plaintiffs that Friedman's oral representations did not accurately 
reflect the written Policy. " Id. at 699. See also Rutz v. Government Employees Ins. Co. 
26 
4 S.W.3d 838, 841 (Tex. App 1999) (An insured has a duty to read the policy and failing 
to do so, is charged with knowledge of the policy terms and conditions). 
In Hartford Ins. Co. of the Southeast v Franklin, 424 S.E. 2d 803 (Ga. 1992) the 
court considered pre-policy representations as to what the extent of coverage would be. 
The court stated, citing prior precedent, "We declined to apply the doctrine of estoppel 
because the insured was under a duty to read and examine the policy and to reject it as 
unacceptable or renegotiate it if the coverage the insured sought was not provided in the 
policy." Id. at 805. 
See also Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Ben Lewis Plumbing, Heating & Air 
Conditioning, Inc. 710 A.2d 338 (Md. 1998) (recognizing a duty to read the policy of 
insurance in the face of misrepresentation and estoppel claims); Sophie v. Lincoln 
National Life Ins. Co. F. Supp.Lexis 14861 (N.D. 111. 1997) (The plaintiffs had the means 
to ascertain the true facts as to the extent of any coverage where names of phone numbers 
of persons existed, to call regarding extent of coverage). 
Even where courts recognize estoppel in relation to insurance policies, the courts 
hold that there is not reasonable reliance justifying estoppel where the insured has but 
does not read the policy. See, e.g. Leibman v. Prudential Financial, Inc. F. Supp., 20 
Lexis 21048 (E.D. Pa. 2004) (Applying New Jersey law which recognized equitable 
estoppel regarding pre-policy representations, however, "where policy terms are clearly 
worded and conspicuously displayed, an insured may not avoid policy terms based on her 
failure to read or understand the policy."); Redmond v. State Farm Ins. Co., 728 A.2d 
1202 (D.C. Ct. App. 1999) (Notwithstanding representation made by State Farm's agent, 
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the doctrines of equitable estoppel and reformation do not apply where the language of 
the policy is clear); 
In the present case, the insured received a copy of the policy. Facts, above, para. 
20. The concerns of the dissent in Martinez, above, remain under the facts of this case, 
that is, enforcement of the policy without regard to its provisions. And the concerns of 
the majority in Martinez disappear. Youngblood had the opportunity to read the policy. 
It was available for him to determine the extent of coverage. He was even warned, in 
bold capital letters, to read the Policy carefully. Facts, above, para. 21. The policy 
language concerning UIM coverage applying only if he were a motorist, is clear and 
unambiguous. See Facts above, paras. 17-18. If any provisions were not clear, he could 
have sought clarification. As a result, estoppel should not be applied to the facts at bar to 
allow coverage never intended or expected or accounted for by the insured. 
POINT VI 
THE HARR CASE RELIED UPON BY THE COURT OF APPEALS IS 
GREATLY DISTINGUISHABLE FROM THE CASE AT BAR 
In its decision in this case, the panel of the Court of Appeals, in the face of cases 
to the contrary stated, "We are particularly persuaded by the reasoning of Harr v. Allstate 
Insurance Co, 54 N.J. 287, 255 A. 2d 208 (N.J. 1969). . . "Youngblood, 2005 UT App 
154, PI8. However, several very significant differences make one believe that even the 
New Jersey court in Harr would rule differently under the present facts. 
First, the person making the representations concerning coverage in Harr was an 
employee/agent of the defendant insurer not an independent contractor as is the case at 
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bar (see Facts, above, para. 7). The court in Harr stated: "It is our understanding that 
defendant does not write insurance through so-called 'independent' agents but rather does 
business only by its own employees. Consequently we assume Meinsohn [the agent] was 
defendant's employee." Harr at 211, nl. Also, the court recognized, and apparently felt 
it important that, w*it was stipulated" that Meinsohn was defendant's agent. Id. at 211. 
For i\\z reasons why it should make a significant difference whether the agent was an 
independent contractor or an employee, see Point II, above. 
Second, in Harr, the day before the plaintiff was going on vacation, plaintiff called 
the agent to specifically enquire if the merchandise in his basement could be covered for 
up to $15,000. Id. at 212. The agent said he would have to check and would call Harr 
back. Id. at 212. The agent called back saying, "Mr. Harr, we can cover you for $7,500 
and you axe fully covered. Go to Florida and have a good time." Id. at 212. (Emphasis in 
the original). The actions of the agent in Harr were in the nature of a binder. The trip 
was in the middle of January and the loss occurred in February. Id. at 211. Insurance 
agents can bind their principles. It is not unusual for a person to call an agent and ask for 
a binder, for example, when a person buys a new car. The case at bar is not similar to a 
binder-type representation as in Harr. 
Third, the plaintiff in Harr did not receive the contract regarding the new 
coverage: "Harr did not receive the contract. . . before he left for Florida, but testified he 
took Meinsohn's word that he was folly covered." Id. at 212. He read it later, but it is 
unclear whether it arrived before the loss: "He was not asked if he read it before or after 
29 
he learned of the water damage." Id. at 212 and 221. In the present case, Mr. 
Youngblood received the policy well before the loss. Facts, above, para. 20. 
Fourth, the 1963 Harr policy was "confusing and abstruse." Id. at 212. For a 
lengthy discussion of the confusion see pages 212-213. The policy at issue is not 
confusing but clear and simply worded. See Facts, above, paras. 17-18, 23. 
Fifth, concerning "the element of reliance," the New Jersey court held that Mr. 
Harr relied on the statement of the agent that he was fully covered, which "demonstrates 
sufficient reliance at least until the written contract reached him and he had a reasonable 
opportunity to examine it." Id. at 220. (Emphasis added). That language implies that 
even the New Jersey court, upon which the Court of Appeals relied in the case at bar, 
may not allow estoppel if the insured has received a copy of the policy and has had 
opportunity to read it. The Harr court found the policy so confusing that even if Mr. 
Harr had received it prior to the loss, he was excused in that regard; "he will only be held 
to that to which he would be alerted thereby [by a review of the policy]." Id. at 221. 
See a later New Jersey case, Martinez v John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 367 
A.2d 904 (N.J. 1976) which notes the general rule that insureds are charged with 
knowledge of their contracts, with some exceptions. 
in the present case, because the sales agent was an independent contractor, the 
circumstances were not similar to a binder, Youngblood had received a copy of the 
Policy before the loss, the language of the policy was not obscure and abstruse, and there 
was no reasonable reliance, this court should reverse the Court of Appeals and affirm the 
Summary Judgments granted by the trial court. 
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Although Harr is clearly distinguishable, it is admitted, that the court in Harr did 
state that equitable estoppel is available under proper circumstances regarding coverage, 
as did the other cases cited by the Court of Appeals panel in this case. However, this is 
not one of those proper cases where estoppel should be allow even under those other 
states' cases. 
POINT VII 
PLAINTIFF DID NOT REASONABLY RELY ON THE STATEMENTS 
OF THE COTTONWOOD INSURANCE AGENCY'S SALES PERSON. 
One of the elements of estoppel, even where it is applied to insurance coverage, is 
reasonable reliance. Even if this Court would allow estoppel to create non-existent 
coverage, Youngblood did not reasonably rely on the statements of the Cottonwood 
Insurance agent for the following reasons: (1) Youngblood did not allege any such 
representations and reliance thereon in his Amended Complaint, estoppel should not 
apply under such circumstances, (2) factually Youngblood felt the examples regarding 
him as a pedestrian or sitting at his desk were lame, (3) he questionably declared he relied 
thereon in his deposition when specifically asked if he did, stating he wanted his cars 
covered; (4) the examples did not make sense that underinsured "motorist" coverage 
UIM would exist for the examples given by the Cottonwood agent such as sitting at his 
desk, (5) this Court should not consider reliance on oral examples of an independent 
agent reasonable when Youngblood had the ability to determine precisely what the 
coverage was by reading the Policy which he was supplied, (6) the Policy cover sheet 
warned Youngblood to read the Policy carefully and rely thereon because it set out the 
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agreement between insured and insurer. Each of the above will be discussed under 
separate heading below. 
(1) Youngblood did not allege any such representations or reliance thereon in his 
Amended Complaint. Estoppel should not apply under such circumstances. See Point I, 
above. 
(2) Factually, Youngblood felt the examples regarding him as a pedestrian or 
sitting at his desk were lame. In his deposition, Youngblood stated that the examples of 
the Cottonwood agent concerning pedestrians and sitting at his desk were lame, thus 
implying he did not give them credence, did not rely on them. 
To result in estoppel, reliance must be reasonable. It is not reasonable to rely on 
lame examples. 
A failure to demonstrate that the independent agent promised specific coverage as 
opposed to giving some lame examples, should not justify reliance or estoppel. 
(3) Youngblood questionably declared that he relied thereon in his deposition 
when specifically asked if he did, stating he wanted his cars covered; 
Youngblood was specifically asked if he relied on such lame examples. He did 
say, '"Well, yesv, but continued that he really wanted his good cars covered. Facts, 
above, para. 12. Such questionable reliance, is not reasonable reliance, is not justifiable 
reliance. 
(4) The examples did not make sense that underinsured motorist coverage would 
exist for the examples given by the Cottonwood agent such as sitting at his desk. 
Reliance must be reasonable. It is unreasonable that underinsured "motorist" coverage 
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would exist or be an important protection for the plaintiff sitting at his desk. (Facts, 
above, para. 10). Any reliance on such examples, recognized by the Youngblood as 
lame, is unreasonable. 
(5) This Court should not consider reliance on oral examples of an independent 
agent reasonable to provide non-existent coverage, when Youngblood had the ability to 
determine precisely what the coverage was by reading the Policy which he was supplied. 
The agent involved in the sale of the insurance was with Cottonwood Insurance Agency. 
Facts, above, para. 7. An insured should not be found to have reasonably relied upon an 
independent agent's questionable, lame examples, to bind an insurer, where the Policy is 
sent to the insured, and he/she has opportunity to read it. The Insurer's written 
expression of coverage, should be reasonably relied upon, not some example by an 
independent agent. 
(6) the Policy cover sheet warned the Youngblood to read the Policy carefully and 
rely thereon because it set out the agreement between insured and insurer. The cover to 
the Policy warned Youngblood in capitalized, bold letters, to read the policy carefully 
because it contained the rights and obligations of the parties. Facts, above, para. 21. The 
language is clear and simple. Youngblood is warned thereby that even the brief outline in 
the cover sheet, which came from the insurer itself as opposed to an independent sales' 
agent, should not be relied upon, because only the Policy contains the rights and 
obligations of the parties. Facts, above para. 21. In the face of such a warning, reliance 
on the lame examples of an independent sales agent should be unreasonable as a matter 
of law. 
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POINT VIII 
EVEN WHERE THE PRE-CONTRACT REPRESENTATIONS ARE IN 
WRITING, COURTS OFTEN REFUSE TO APPLY ESTOPPEL TO 
EXPANCD COVERAGE; BUT IF THIS COURT SHOULD RECOGNIZE 
ESTOPPEL TO EXPAND COVERAGE, IT SHOULD ONLY BE 
ALLOW UNDER RELIABLE CIRCUMSTANCES 
In Couch on Insurance 3d (2005), estoppel is declared not well recognized even 
where written promotional materials contain representations: 
"With the exception of group insurance policies, . . . a prospectus, 
pamphlet, schedule, or illustration which is not attached or referred 
to in the policy does not generally form apart of the contract, and is 
not binding on the insurer. However, the facts may be such that a 
different conclusions is warranted. For example, knowingly false 
statements and in a pamphlet or advertisement have rendered the 
company responsible for such statements liable to one who relied 
upon them." 
Id.dX 18:19. Couch continues: 
"There is greater justification for regarding the prospectus, 
pamphlet, schedule, or illustration as part of the contract where it is referred 
to in the policy or attached to it. 
Id. at 18:19. Couch recognizes that there are cases to the contrary. 
In the present case, the alleged statements by the independent agent were, at the 
very best, in the nature of an illustration, and should not result in estoppel. 
Although this court should not allow estoppel to expand coverage beyond that 
which is expected by the insurer, if the court does, it should only do so under very limited 
circumstances which by themselves have indicia of reliability. Because it is so easy for a 
plaintiff, who is seeking recovery, to assert that a sales person made representations 
which would allow the plaintiff to recover large amounts of money for risks not covered 
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in a policy, if estoppel is allow to expand coverage beyond that which is expected in the 
policy, it should be allow only under very narrow circumstances. 
With respect to estoppel against a governmental entity this court, for example, 
provides that no such estoppel will lie unless the representations are established in 
writing. See, Celebrity Club, Inc. v Utah Liquor Control Commission, 602 P.2d 689 (Utah 
1979); Anderson v. Public Service Commission, 839 P.2d 822 (Utah 1992). 
Only if this Court is inclined to allow estoppel to expand coverage, such a 
requirement as a written representation should be adopted in the case of insurance as in 
the case of governmental entities, to ensure reliability in the face of easy allegations of 
oral statements of coverage which a plaintiff hopes to expand. 
Some state courts will allow estoppel to expand coverage if the pre-policy 
representations were made in writing authorized by the insurer. For example, Marlin v. 
Wetzel County Board of Education, 569 S.E.2d 462 (W.Va. 2002) (misrepresentations in 
writing through a certificate of insurance could result in estoppel to deny lack of 
coverage); United Pacific Ins. Co. v. Meyer, 305 F. 2d 107 (9th Cir. 1962) (Where the 
insurer issued a written certificate of insurance which reasonably led the insured to 
believe coverage existed, insurer was estopped to deny coverage); Farmers Mutual Auto. 
Ins. Co. v. Bechard 122 N.W. 2d 86 (S.D. 1963) (misrepresentations in writing resulted 
in estoppel). 
If this court should recognize estoppel to expand coverage, which Auto-owners 
declares it should not do, at the very least, it should only be applied where the alleged 
representations are in writing, directly from the insurer as opposed to an independent 
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contractor, and clearly misrepresent coverage not in the policy. Generalities should not 
suffice, and misrepresentations must be specific as to specific coverage. Also some 
courts require that any misrepresentations must be knowingly false, akin to fraud, or there 
must be a higher than normal standard of proof Such safeguards should be adopted if 
estoppel is recognized to expand coverage. 
CONCLUSION 
The Summary Judgment granted by the trial court should be affirmed in favor of 
Auto-owners, and the decision of the Court of Appeals reversed. 
DATED this <S^day of August, 2005. 
KIRTON & McCONKIE 
KbBERT R. WALLACE 
Attorney for Defendant - Appellee 
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CASE SUMMARY 
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Appellant insured challenged a decision of the Third District, 
Salt Lake Department (Utah), which granted summary judgment in favor of appellee 
insurer in connection with the insured's claims of equitable estoppel and bad faith. 
OVERVIEW: The insured purchased an automobile insurance policy from the insurer. 
The insured was struck by an automobile while walking in a parking lot. He sought 
underinsured motorist coverage from the insurer in this action. The trial court ruled in 
the insurer's favor, but the court reversed. The court adopted the view that estoppel 
could not generally be used to extend the terms of an insurance contract, but estoppel 
could bar an insurer's defense of noncoverage in the limited circumstances when an 
insurance agent made material misrepresentations to a prospective insured before or at 
the inception of the contract and the prospective insured reasonably relied upon such 
misrepresentations in purchasing the policy. In this case, the insured testified that an 
agent of the insurer misrepresented the scope of the policy before it was purchased. 
Based on this, the insured showed a disputed issue of fact as to whether material 
misrepresentations were made to him by the agent before he entered the contract. 
There was also an issue as to whether the insured reasonably relied on the 
representations made. A remand was necessary. 
OUTCOME: The court reversed and remanded. 
CORE TERMS: coverage, insured, misrepresentation, insurer, estoppel, reasonably relied, 
estopped, inception, insurance contract, insurance policy, purchasing, summary judgment, 
insurance agent, denying coverage, equitable estoppel, doctrine of estoppel, purchaser, 
insurance coverage, misrepresented, deposition testimony, misrepresents, pedestrian, 
prospective purchaser, expressly excluded, estopped to deny, written policy, life insurance, 
detriment, broaden, granting summary judgment 
LexisNexis(R) Headnotes • Hide Headnotes 
Civil Procedure > Summary Judgment > Standards of Review %±1 
Civil Procedure > Summary Judgment > Summary Judgment Standard 
H/VI±Summary judgment is appropriate only when there are no genuine issues of 
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Utah 
R. Civ. P. 56(c). When reviewing a grant of summary judgment, the appellate court 
views all facts and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party and reviews the trial court's conclusions of law 
for correctness. More Like This Headnote 
Contracts Law > Contract Conditions & Provisions > Equitable Estoppel 
w/V2±Utah courts define equitable estoppel as conduct by one party which leads another 
party, in reliance thereon, to adopt a course of action resulting in detriment or 
damage if the first party is permitted to repudiate his conduct. More Like This Headnote 
Contracts Law > Defenses > Fraud & Misrepresentation %D 
H/v3±Utah courts have held that for a claim of misrepresentation to modify a contract, it 
is not essential that the party making the representations knew that they were 
false, if they were in fact false and material, and the other party had a right to rely 
thereon, and did so. Thus, to escape the language of a contract, there must be a 
false and material statement made before the contract is consummated and the 
plaintiff must have reasonably relied upon such statement. More Like This Headnote 
Contracts Law > Contract Conditions & Provisions > Equitable Estoppel 
Insurance Law > Claims & Contracts > Contract Formation 
HN4+tother jurisdictions hold that an insurer may be estopped from asserting particular 
policy provisions, even though the effect may be to bring within the coverage of the 
policy risks not covered by its terms, when an insurance agent misrepresents the 
coverage of the insurance contract and where the insured reasonably relies on the 
misrepresentation when purchasing the insurance. The Court of Appeals of Utah is 
persuaded by this View. More Like This Headnote 
Contracts Law > Contract Conditions & Provisions > Equitable Estoppel 
Si 
€l 
Insurance Law > Claims & Contracts > Contract Formation 
HN5±Equitable estoppel is available to broaden insurance coverage and estoppel may bar 
the insurance company's defense of noncoverage where the insurance company 
agent made misrepresentations before the contract was executed and the 
purchaser reasonably relied on those misrepresentations in purchasing the 
pol icy. More Like This Headnote 
Contracts Law > Contract Conditions & Provisions > Equitable Estoppel 
Insurance Law > Claims & Contracts > Contract Formation ^ t 
HN6±\Nhere an insurer or its agent misrepresents, even though innocently, the coverage 
of an insurance contract, or the exclusions therefrom, to an insured before or at the 
inception of the contract, and the insured reasonably relies thereupon to his 
ultimate detriment, the insurer is estopped to deny coverage after a loss on a risk 
or from a peril actually not covered by the terms of the policy. The proposition is 
one of elementary and simple justice and by justifiably relying on the insurer's 
superior knowledge, the insured has been prevented from procuring the desired 
coverage elsewhere. To reject this approach because a new contract is thereby 
made for the parties would be an unfortunate triumph of form over 
substance. More Like This Headnote 
Contracts Law > Contract Conditions & Provisions > Equitable Estoppel L*iu 
Insurance Law > Claims & Contracts > Contract Formation k*ijy 
HN7±Estoppel may be used to expand the terms of a policy when the agent 
misrepresents the coverage of the insurance contract before or at its inception and 
where the insured reasonably relies. While estoppel cannot be invoked to create 
coverage clearly excluded by a written contract of insurance, the concept may be 
utilized against an insurer when its conduct has been such as to induce action in 
re l iance on i t . More Like This Headnote 
Contracts Law > Contract Conditions & Provisions > Equitable Estoppel *J3 
Insurance Law > Claims & Contracts > Contract Formation -*J3 
Hyvs±An insurer may be estopped from denying coverage when the insurer's agent 
makes oral misrepresentations regarding the coverage provided by the policy and 
the purchaser reasonably relies on such misrepresentations. It is true that courts in 
Indiana and elsewhere, realizing that many people do not read their insurance 
policies and, perhaps even more important, do not do so because the policies are 
unreadable, have held that the agent's oral representations at the time of sale can 
override the written terms of the policy. If the agent insists to the prospective 
purchaser that the policy will insure against a hazard that the prospective 
purchaser is particularly concerned about, and the hazard materializes, the 
company may be estopped to plead the terms of the policy because the strength of 
the agent's oral assurances lulled the prospective purchaser into not reading, or 
reading inattentively, dense and rebarbative policy language. More Like This Headnote 
Contracts Law > Contract Conditions & Provisions > Equitable Estoppel -*yJ 
Insurance Law > Claims & Contracts > Contract Formation k«3 
H/v9±The Court of Appeals of Utah adopts the view that estoppel may not generally be 
used to extend the terms of an insurance contract. However, estoppel may bar an 
insurer's defense of noncoverage in the limited circumstances when an insurance 
agent makes material misrepresentations to a prospective insured before or at the 
inception of the contract and the prospective insured reasonably relies upon such 
misrepresentations in purchasing the insurance. More Like This Headnote 
Contracts Law > Contract Conditions & Provisions > Equitable Estoppel k*3 
Insurance Law > Claims & Contracts > Contract Formation %& 
H / v l 0±The second key requirement for equitable estoppel to apply to modify an 
insurance contract is reasonable reliance upon the precontract misrepresentations. 
Reasonable reliance must be considered with reference to the facts of each case, 
and is usually a question for the jury to determine. Although it is impossible to 
draw precise legal boundaries of when reliance is reasonable, the courts have 
given some direction. Generally, a plaintiff may justifiably rely on positive 
assertions of fact without independent investigation. It is only where, under the 
circumstances, the facts should make it apparent to one of his knowledge and 
intelligence, or he has discovered something which should serve as a warning that 
he is being deceived, that a plaintiff is required to make his own investigation. A 
plaintiff who fails to read a contract without fault on the part of the defendant 
generally is found not to have reasonably relied. Where there is nothing said or 
done which would be reasonably calculated to disarm a reasonably prudent person 
so that he would sign the contract without reading it and in the absence of some 
act or artifice in inducing the other part to refrain from reading the contract, relief 
from the f raud is Often den ied . More Like This Headnote 
Contracts Law > Contract Conditions & Provisions > Equitable Estoppel 
Insurance Law > Claims & Contracts > Contract Formation 
HN11±Regarding estoppel and an insurance contract formation, the rule set forth is a 
narrow one and applies only in limited circumstances. The representations must 
be clear and material and must be made in an attempt to induce the potential 
insured to enter into the contract. The representations must lead the potential 
insured to feel as though he or she need not read the contract, and the 
representations must be of the type that a reasonable person would rely 
upon . More Like This Headnote 
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JUDGES: BILLINGS, Presiding Judge. WE CONCUR: Norman H. Jackson, Judge, Gregory K. 
Orme, Judge 
OPINIONBY: Judith M. Billings 
OPINION: 
[ * *830 ] BILLINGS, Presiding Judge: 
[*P1] Robert L. Youngblood I I appeals the trial court's order granting summary judgment 
to Auto-Owners Insurance Company (Auto-Owners) on Youngblood's claims of equitable 
estoppel and bad faith. We reverse and remand. 
BACKGROUND 
[*P2] Youngblood, the president and sole owner of Youngblood Home Improvement, Inc., 
purchased an auto insurance policy (the Policy) from Auto-Owners for his business. The 
Policy contained coverage for certain specifically designated motor vehicles, and 
underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage if those vehicles were involved in an accident with an 
underinsured motorist. The Policy provided UIM coverage of $ 300,000 per person. 
[*P3] Youngblood never read the Policy, which provided that Auto-Owners "will pay 
compensatory damages [that the [ * * * 2 ] named insured is] legally entitled to recover. . . 
from the owner or operator of any underinsured automobile . . . for bodily injury [the named 
insured] sustains . . . when [the named insured is] a pedestrian." 
[*P4] When Youngblood purchased the Policy, he spoke with an Auto-Owners insurance 
agent. According to Youngblood's deposition testimony, the agent made representations 
which Youngblood relied upon in purchasing [ * *831] the Policy. Specifically, Youngblood 
testified that the agent 
gave me a scenario . . . probably just a scare tactic. He said . . . 'the reason you 
have [UIM and uninsured motorist coverage] is you have to protect your family.1 
And he said 'if you're walking down the street, you've got nothing if you . . . don't 
have underinsured and uninsured motorist and somebody runs you over. You 
could be sitting at your desk or walking down the street and if you don't have the 
coverage, you've got nothing.' 
[*P5] Youngblood testified that the agent went on to tell him that "'the only thing I would 
recommend, other than [the UIM coverage] is to get some kind of wage protection . . . at the 
very least you should buy underinsured motorist and uninsured [ * * * 3 ] motorist because 
there are a lot of people out there . . . that don't carry insurance at all.'" Youngblood testified 
that he relied on these statements because the agents were "selling a lot of insurance and 
knew what they were doing." Finally, at the time of purchasing the Policy, Youngblood 
testified that no Auto-Owners agent told him that because the Policy was a corporate policy it 
would not cover Youngblood personally should he become the victim of a pedestrian accident. 
[*P6] After purchasing the Policy, on December 30, 1997, Youngblood was walking across 
a parking lot toward a medical office when he was struck by an automobile driven by Rachel 
Cooksey. Cooksey had $ 50,000 available in liability insurance. Youngblood settled with 
Cooksey for her policy limits, however, he alleges that hospital bills for his injuries sustained 
as a result of the accident exceed $ 50,000. 
[*P7] Prior to settling with Cooksey, Youngblood asked Auto-Owners to waive its 
subrogation rights to ensure that settlement would not jeopardize his entitlement to UIM 
benefits under the Policy. Auto-Owners agreed to do so and Youngblood executed a release 
and settlement agreement to Cooksey in exchange [ * * * 4 ] for the $ 50,000 liability 
insurance. Youngblood sent Auto-Owners a copy of the release along with documents 
evidencing Youngblood's damages and a UIM settlement demand. 
[*P8] On January 5, 2002, Auto-Owners sent Youngblood a letter which first recognized 
that Youngblood was the insured under the Policy and then stated "we have determined this 
claim will be honored." However, on March 11, 2002, Auto-Owners sent Youngblood a letter 
stating that "further review of the coverage" had caused Auto-Owners to take the position 
that because Youngblood was not occupying the insured vehicle, "there is no coverage 
afforded to him for this loss and we will defend based on this issue." 
[*P9] Youngblood brought suit against Auto-Owners alleging that he was entitled to UIM 
benefits and that Auto-Owners breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing. After limited 
discovery, Auto-Owners filed a motion for summary judgment which the trial court granted. 
Youngblood appeals. 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
[*P10] Youngblood argues that the trial court erred in granting Auto-Owners's motion for 
summary judgment. H/VI7Summary judgment is appropriate only when there are no genuine 
issues of [ * * * 5 ] material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law. See Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). When reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we view all 
facts and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party and review the trial court's conclusions of law for correctness. See 
Lovendahl v. Jordan Sch. Dist, 2002 UT 130, P13, 63 P.3d 705. 
ANALYSIS 
[*P11] Youngblood argues that the trial court erred in granting Auto-Owners's motion for 
summary judgment relying on Perkins v. Great-West Life Assurance Co., 814 P.2d 1125 
fUtah Ct. App. 1991)f and that Auto-Owners should be equitably estopped from denying 
coverage where Youngblood reasonably relied on Auto-Owners's misrepresentations made 
prior to his purchase of the Policy. We agree with Youngblood that the granting of summary 
judgment was error. 
[ * *832] I. Equitable Estoppel 
[*P12] " ^ ^ U t a h courts define equitable estoppel as "conduct by one party which leads 
another party, in reliance thereon, to adopt a course of action resulting in detriment or 
damage if the first party is permitted to repudiate his conduct." United Am. Life Ins. Co. v. 
Zions First Nat'l Bank, 641 P.2d 158, 161 fUtah 1982). [ * * * 6 ] 
[*P13] In Perkins, the case the trial court relied upon in granting summary judgment, this 
court determined that an insurance company was not estopped from denying a claim for life 
insurance where the policy clearly stated that coverage extended only to "active, full-time 
employees." 814 P.2d at 1128. Perkins worked as a nurse for sixteen and one-half years until 
she became disabled and was unable to work. See id. at 1127. Great-West Insurance 
Company (Great-West) mistakenly paid medical benefits and accepted and retained 
premiums on behalf of Perkins in reliance on representations made by her in an application 
for health and life insurance that she worked full time. See id. Upon Perkins's death and her 
husband's claim for life insurance, Great-West denied the claim on the basis that Perkins was 
never eligible for insurance coverage because she did not work full time. See id. at 1128. We 
determined that estoppel could not be used to extend coverage to risks not covered by the 
express terms of the policy. See id. at 1130-31. Moreover, "given Mrs. Perkins'[s] failure to 
learn the terms of her insurance policy, [ * * * 7 ] her reliance thereon was not reasonable." 
Id. at 1131. 
[*P14] Simply put, Perkins does not present a similar factual scenario as the instant case. 
Youngblood's deposition testimony alleges that an Auto-Owners agent misrepresented the 
scope of the Policy before it was purchased. In Perkins, there were no representations made 
by Great-West as to coverage, rather Great-West mistakenly paid benefits and accepted 
premiums based on Perkins's inaccurate application indicating she was a full-time employee. 
See id. at 1127. Therefore, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment based on 
Perkins, n l 
Footnotes 
n l In Perkins v. Great-West Life Assurance Co., 814 P.2d 1125 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), we 
noted that a "great majority of states dealing with the doctrine of estoppel have held that it 
cannot be used to bring risks which were not covered by the terms of the policy within 
coverage of the policy." Id. at 1131 (citing numerous cases standing for this proposition). 
However, the cases cited are all factually distinct from the instant case in that none deal with 
misrepresentations before the insurance policy was purchased. 
End Footnotes [***8] 
[*P15] This is a case of first impression in Utah. Utah courts have never dealt with the 
doctrine of estoppel in an insurance coverage case where an insurance agent allegedly made 
material misrepresentations as to coverage before a policy was purchased. However, HN3 
*Utah courts have held that for a claim of misrepresentation to modify a contract, it is not 
essential that the party making the representations knew that they were false, if they were in 
fact false and material, and the other party had a right to rely thereon, and did so. See, e.g., 
Smith v. Columbus Buggy Co., 40 Utah 580, 123 P. 580, 585 (1912). Thus, to escape the 
language of a contract, there must be a false and material statement made before the 
contract is consummated and the plaintiff must have reasonably relied upon such statement. 
[*P16] Turning to other jurisdictions, there is a split of authority as to whether in some 
circumstances equitable estoppel may be utilized to modify the terms of an insurance policy. 
Some jurisdictions hold that the doctrine of estoppel may not be used to expand an insurance 
policy's coverage to include risks that the policy specifically excludes. See, [ * * * 9 ] e.g., 
Nicholls v. Zurich Am. Ins. Group, 244 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1157 (D. Colo. 2003) (stating 
under Colorado law, "the doctrine of estoppel cannot, based upon conduct of insurer, bring 
within coverage of [the] insurance policy risks not covered by its terms or risks expressly 
excluded from the policy"); Harasyn v. St. Paul Guardian Ins. Co., 349 Ark. 9, 75 S.W.3d 
696, 702 (Ark. 2002) (holding that the doctrine of waiver or estoppel cannot be given the 
effect of enlarging or extending the coverage as defined in the contract); Ouillian v. Equitable 
Life Assurance Soc'v, 61 Ga. App. 138, 6 S.E.2d 108, 112 fGa. Ct. App. 1939) (holding that 
neither waiver nor estoppel was available to radically change the terms of an [ * *833] 
insurance policy to cover additional subject matter, causes of loss, or matters expressly 
excluded from the coverage of the policy). 
[*P17] HN4*+0ther jurisdictions, however, hold that an insurer may be estopped from 
asserting particular policy provisions, even though the effect may be to bring within the 
coverage of the policy risks not covered by its terms, when an insurance agent misrepresents 
the coverage of the insurance [ * * *10 ] contract and where the insured reasonably relies on 
the misrepresentation when purchasing the insurance. We are persuaded by this view. 
[*P18] We are particularly persuaded by the reasoning of Harr v. Allstate Insurance Co., 
54 NJ. 287, 255 A.2d 208 (N.J. 1969), where the New Jersey Supreme Court overturned 
prior state precedent in holding that "^^equi table estoppel was available to broaden 
insurance coverage and that estoppel may bar the insurance company's defense of 
noncoverage where the insurance company agent made misrepresentations before the 
contract was executed and the purchaser reasonably relied on those misrepresentations in 
purchasing the policy. See id. at 219. In Harr, there was evidence that the insured had relied 
to his detriment on the agent's misrepresentations regarding the scope of fire insurance 
coverage, as the agent told the insured that he was "fully covered" when in fact the terms of 
the policy specified certain exclusions. Id. at 220. The insured did not receive a copy of the 
policy, but stated that he took the agent's word that he was "fully covered" because he "felt 
like [he] had confidence in him." Id. at 212. The [ * * * n ] New Jersey Supreme Court 
analyzed the view that estoppel is not available to broaden coverage and noted that many 
cases comprising this view "are confusing and not clear cut" because "estoppel and waiver 
are often interchangeably and improperly used, and in many cases where estoppel is held 
unavailable[,] the necessary elements have not been made out anyway, or the insured by 
reason of his own conduct is clearly not entitled to relief." Id. at 218. The court noted that it 
is more impressed by decisions proceeding 
on the thesis that HN6w+where an insurer or its agent misrepresents, even though 
innocently, the coverage of an insurance contract, or the exclusions therefrom* to 
an insured before or at the inception of the contract, and the insured reasonably 
relies thereupon to his ultimate detriment, the insurer is estopped to deny 
coverage after a loss on a risk or from a peril actually not covered by the terms 
of the policy. 
Id. at 219. Finally, the court noted that "the [above stated] proposition is one of elementary 
and simple justice" and "by justifiably relying on the insurer's superior knowledge, the 
insured has been prevented from procuring the desired [ * * *12 ] coverage elsewhere." Id. 
"To reject this approach because a new contract is thereby made for the parties would be an 
unfortunate triumph of form over substance." Id. 
[*P19] The Florida case of Peninsular Life Insurance Co. v. Wade, 425 So. 2d 1181 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1983^ also exemplifies the position that estoppel may be used to broaden 
insurance contract coverage where the insurer makes misrepresentations before the policy is 
purchased. See id. at 1183-84. In Peninsular, the Florida district court determined that the 
insurer was estopped to deny full coverage on a life insurance policy, notwithstanding a clear 
and unambiguous policy provision limiting coverage, where the insurer's agent held himself 
out as an expert and misrepresented to the insured and his wife that the policy would provide 
"full coverage" at the time of purchasing the policy and where the insured reasonably relied. 
Id. When the insured read the policy a few days later and questioned the agent about a 
particular provision, the agent told the insured that he was one of the few people who 
understood the policy and that the policy would pay full benefits from [ * * * 1 3 ] the date of 
issuance. See id. at 1182. Although the facts differ slightly from those in the case before us 
because there were misrepresentations both before and after the purchasing of the policy, 
the Florida court stated that it agreed with the reasoning of the New Jersey Supreme Court in 
Harr and held that H/V7!?estoppel may be used to expand the terms of a policy when the 
agent misrepresents the coverage of the insurance contract before or at its inception and 
where the insured reasonably relies. See id. at 1183-84; see Harr. 255 A.2d at [ * *834] 
219; see also Kramer v. United Servs. Auto. Assoc, 436 So. 2d 935. 937 (Fla, Dist. Ct. App. 
1983) (quoting Peninsular and stating that the doctrine that waiver and estoppel are not 
available to extend coverage of insurance policy is not applied without exception; when a 
insurance agent misrepresents coverage before or at the inception of the contract and the 
insured reasonably relies, the insurer is estopped to deny coverage). The court in Peninsular 
went on to state that "while estoppel cannot be invoked to create coverage clearly excluded 
by a written contract of insurance, [ * * * 1 4 ] the concept may be utilized against an insurer 
when its conduct has been such as to induce action in reliance on it." 425 So. 2d at 1184 
(quoting Burns v. Consolidated Am. Ins. Co.. 359 So. 2d 1203. 1207 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1978)). 
[*P20] Indiana has also adopted the rule that H /vs?an insurer may be estopped from 
denying coverage when the insurer's agent makes oral misrepresentations regarding the 
coverage provided by the policy and the purchaser reasonably relies on such 
misrepresentations. See Village Furniture. Inc. v. Associated Ins. Managers. Inc.. 541 N.E.2d 
306. 308 find. Ct. App. 1989). In Village Furniture, the court stated, 
I t is true that courts in Indiana and elsewhere, realizing that many people do not 
read their insurance policies and, perhaps even more important, do not do so 
because the policies are unreadable, have held that the agent's oral 
representations at the time of sale can override the written terms of the policy. If 
the agent insists to the prospective purchaser that the policy will insure against a 
hazard that the prospective purchaser] is particularly concerned about, and the 
hazard materializes, [ * * * 1 5 ] the company may be estopped to plead the 
terms of the policy because the strength of the agent's oral assurances lulled the 
prospective purchaser] into not reading, or reading inattentively, dense and 
rebarbative policy language. 
Id. (citations and alterations omitted); see also American Family Mut Ins. Co. v. Jeffery, 
2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12225. at *16, 28 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 11, 2000) (holding the insurer was 
estopped from denying coverage where agent told prospective purchaser that policy would 
cover "anything to do with" prospective purchaser's business including use of dump trucks, in 
clear contradiction to written policy which excludes such coverage and where prospective 
purchaser reasonably relied). n2 
Footnotes 
n2 Numerous other jurisdictions have also held that estoppel may bar the insurer's denial of 
coverage when misrepresentations were made before or at the inception of the insurance 
contract and where the prospective insured reasonably relied on those misrepresentations. 
See, e.g., United Pac. Ins. Co. v. Meyer. 305 F.2d 107. 113 f9th Cir. 1962) (applying Idaho 
law and holding "that an insurance company may, through the conduct of its agents, be held 
liable for the coverage of the personal liability of a person not only not named as an insured 
in a policy, but actually expressly excluded by the terms of the written policy"); Ivey v. 
United Nat'l Indem. Co., 259 F.2d 205, 208 f9th Cir. 1958) (holding that under California 
law, "an insurance company may by its conduct or dealings apart from the policy itself be 
estopped from denying . . . coverage . . . [when] the insured has been led to believe [it] is 
protected under the policy"); Allied Mut. Ins. Co. v. Dakota Rose, Inc., 43 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 
1087 (D. S.D. 1999) (holding under South Dakota law, conduct of insurer giving rise to 
estoppel to deny coverage must occur before or at inception of policy and must be shown by 
clear and convincing evidence); County Forest Prod, v. Green Mountain Agency, Inc., 2000 
ME 161, 758 A.2d 59, 66 fMe. 2000) (holding insurer was estopped from denying the 
increase in policy limits because insurer misrepresented to insured that an increase in policy 
limits would be "no problem"); Allstate Ins. Co v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 67 Ore. 
App. 623, 679 P.2d 879, 882 (Or. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that insurance company estopped 
from denying coverage where insured's son reasonably relied on agent's representation that 
son's auto was covered at inception of new policy to cover son); Barth v. State Farm Fire & 
Cas. Co., 214 Pa. Super. 434, 257 A.2d 671, 675 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1969) (holding 
representations in brochure given before the contract was purchased, if reasonably relied 
upon, may be considered terms of the contract); Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Marine Contracting 
& Towing Co., 301 S.C. 418, 392 S.E.2d 460, 462 fS.C. 1990) (holding "the scope of risk 
under an insurance policy may be extended by estoppel if the insurer has misled the insured 
into believing the particular risk is within the coverage"); State Auto. Cas. Underwriters v. 
Ruotsalainen, 81 S.D. 472, 136 N.W.2d 884r 887 (S.D. 1965) (holding insurer was estopped 
from denying coverage where agent assured insured that policy covered liability arising out 
of use of trailer); Farmers Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Bechard, 80 S.D. 237, 122 N.W.2d 86, 92 
(S.D. 1963) (allowing oral representations of insurance agent to limit exclusions in written 
policy); Marlin v. Wetzel County Bd. of Educ, 212 W. Va. 215, 569 S.E.2d 462, 472 (W. Va. 
2002) (holding that "exceptions to the general rule that the doctrine of estoppel may not be 
used to extend insurance coverage beyond the terms of an insurance contract, include, but 
are not necessarily limited to, instances where an insured has been prejudiced because: (1) 
an insurer's, or its agent's, misrepresentation made at the policy's inception resulted in the 
insured being prohibited from procuring the coverage he or she desired"). 
End Footnotes [***16] 
[ * *835 ] [*P21] H/V9"?We adopt the view that estoppel may not generally be used to 
extend the terms of an insurance contract. However, we hold that estoppel may bar an 
insurer's defense of noncoverage in the limited circumstances when an insurance agent 
makes material misrepresentations to a prospective insured before or at the inception of the 
contract and the prospective insured reasonably relies upon such misrepresentations in 
purchasing the insurance. 
[*P22] Based on Youngblood's deposition testimony and affidavit, he has shown at the 
least that there is a disputed issue of material fact as to whether material misrepresentations 
were made to him by an insurance agent before he entered into the contract. n3 
Footnotes 
n3 Youngblood also argues that Auto-Owners should be estopped from denying coverage 
because of misrepresentations that occurred after the inception of the contract. We agree 
with the trial court that Perkins controls any postcontract alleged misrepresentations. 
End Footnotes 
[*P23] HN1(r7The second key requirement for [ * * *17 ] equitable estoppel to apply to 
modify an insurance contract is reasonable reliance upon the precontract misrepresentations. 
"Reasonable reliance must be considered with reference to the facts of each case, and is 
usually a question for the jury to determine." Conder v. A.L. Williams & Assocs., 739 P.2d 
634, 638 fUtah Ct. App. 1987). "Although it is impossible to draw precise legal boundaries of 
when reliance is reasonable . . . the courts have given some direction." Id. 
[*P24] "Generally, a plaintiff may justifiably rely on positive assertions of fact without 
independent investigation." Id. "It is only where, under the circumstances, the facts should 
make it apparent to one of his knowledge and intelligence, or he has discovered something 
which should serve as a warning that he is being deceived, that a plaintiff is required to make 
his own investigation." Id. A plaintiff who fails to read a contract without fault on the part of 
the defendant generally is found not to have reasonably relied. See id. The Utah Supreme 
Court explained in Johnson v. Allen, 108 Utah 148, 158 P.2d 134 (1945), where there is 
nothing 
said or done [ * * * 1 8 ] which would be reasonably calculated to disarm a 
reasonably prudent person so that he would sign the contract without reading it 
and in the absence of some act or artifice in inducing the other part to refrain 
from reading the contract[,] relief from the fraud is often denied. 
Id. at 137. 
[*P25] In Conder, the plaintiff, Conder alleged that during the course of several 
conversations with the defendant's agents regarding prospective employment with the 
defendant company, the agents fraudulently misrepresented the nature of their business and 
employment opportunities that Conder would have by working for the defendant. See 739 
P.2d at 636. Relying upon those statements, Conder alleged that he terminated his former 
employment and was induced to work as an agent of the defendant, suffering various 
damages. See id. We determined that "we cannot say as a matter of law that Conder was 
unreasonable in his reliance on the alleged misrepresentations" made by the agents, id. at 
638-39, because "a plaintiff may justifiably rely on positive assertions of fact without 
independent investigation." Id. at 639. Moreover, [ * * * 1 9 ] Conder did not have the 
knowledge, nor did he discover anything to serve as a warning sign that he was being 
deceived, which would require him to make an investigation of his own. See id. We 
determined that although Conder subsequently entered into a contract expressly limiting his 
employment opportunities, "Conder's affidavit alleges that he was relying on the verbal 
representations of [the defendants] . . . thereby indicating that the contradictory written 
provision was of no effect." Id. 
[*P26] In the instant case, based on Youngblood's deposition testimony and affidavit, 
there is again at least a disputed issue of material fact as to whether Youngblood reasonably 
relied on the representations made by Auto-Owners's agent. Furthermore, the Policy, even if 
read by Youngblood, is not particularly clear as to whether he would receive UIM coverage as 
a pedestrian. n4 This further boosts his subjective claim that he reasonably relied on the 
agent's assertions. 
Footnotes 
n4 The Policy is confusing and does not make clear that Youngblood would not be covered as 
a pedestrian in an accident because the Policy was purchased in the company name rather 
than in his own. 
End Footnotes [ * * * 2 0 ] 
[ *P27] Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment and remand 
for proceedings consistent with this opinion. Moreover, we emphasize that HNllm+the rule we 
have set forth is a narrow one and applies only in limited circumstances. The representations 
must be clear and material and must be made in an attempt to induce the potential insured 
to enter into the contract. The representations must lead the potential insured to feel as 
though he or she need not read the contract, and the representations must be of the type 
that a reasonable person would rely upon. 
CONCLUSION 
[ *P28] We determine that the trial court erred by granting Auto-Owners's motion for 
summary judgment. The judgment of the trial court is reversed. We remand for proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. n5 
Footnotes 
n5 We do not reach the remaining issues on appeal because of our disposition. 
End Footnotes 
Judith M. Billings, 
Presiding Judge 
[*P29] WE CONCUR: 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT L. YOUNGBLOOD, E, 
Plaintiff, 
AUTO-OWNERS INSURANCE 
COMPANY, a corporation, 
Defendant(s). 
ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDMENT 
Judge William B. Bohling 
Civil No. 010911647PI 
Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment came on for hearing on January 5,2004. The 
plaintiff was represented by Peter Collins. The defendant was represented by Robert R. Wallace. 
The court heard oral argument, and read the memoranda on file with respect to this motion. The 
court finds that the insurance policy at issue is clear and unambiguous and that underinsured 
coverage does not exist for the auto-pedestrian accident at issue. The court further finds that 
estoppel does not apply, and that the case of Perkins v. Great-West Life Assurance Company, 814 
P.2d 1125 (Utah App. 1991) controls on issues in this case. The court concurs in arguments of 
the defense, therefore: 
£*t 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that summary judgment is granted in favor of the defendant 
and against the plaintiff on all claims, and all claims are dismissed with prejudice. 
Dated and entered this ^ ' day of January 2004. iSf ********* 
Judge William Bohling 
State District Court Judge 
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Actual Cash Value - $1000 deductible 13.00 
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150 
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Life Home Car Business 
INSURING AGREEMENT 
he attached Declarations describe the automobile(s) we insure and the Coverages and Limits of Liability for which 
ou have paid a premium. We agree to insure the described automobile(s) for those Coverages and Limits of Liability * 
ubject to the terms and conditions of this policy. In return you must pay the premium and comply with all the terms 
nd conditions of this policy. 
SECTION I - DEFINITIONS 
o understand this policy, you must understand the meaning of the following words. These words appear in bold face 
fpe whenever used in this policy and endorsements attached to this policy. 
Automobile means a private passenger automobile, 
a truck, truck tractor, trailer, farm implement or oth-
er land motor vehicle. 
Bodily injury means physical injury, sickness or di-
sease sustained by a person including resulting 
death of that person. 
Equipment means an apparatus or device perma-
nently attached to or installed in your automobile. 
Equipment includes an apparatus or device specif-
ically for use with your automobile. 
Farm implement means motorized self-propelled 
farm machinery. 
Insured contract means: 
a. a lease of premises; 
b. a sidetrack agreement; 
c. an easement or license agreement in con-
nection with vehicle or pedestrian private rail-
road crossings at grade; 
d. any other easement agreement, except in con-
nection with construction or demolition oper-
ations on or within 50 feet of a railroad; 
e. an indemnification of a municipality as required 
by ordinance, except in connection with work 
for a municipality; or 
f. that part of any other contract or agreement 
pertaining to your business under which you 
assume the tort liability of another to pay dam-
ages because of bodily injury or property dam-
age to a third person or organization, if the 
contract or agreement is made before the bod-
ily injury or property damage occurs. Tort li-
ability means liability that would be imposed by 
law in the absence of any contract or agree-
ment. 
An insured contract does not include that part of any 
contract or agreement: 
a. that pertains to the loan, lease or rental of an 
automobile to you; or 
b. that holds a person-or organization engaged in 
the business of transporting property for hire 
harmless for your use of your automobile over 
a route or territory that person or organization 
is authorized to serve by public authority. 
6. Occurrence means an accident that results in bodily 
injury or property damage and includes, as one oc-
currence, all continuous or repeated exposure to 
substantially the same generally harmful conditions. 
7. Private passenger automobile means a four wheel: 
a. private passenger or station wagon type auto-
mobile; or 
b. pickup or van type automobile with a maximum 
load capacity of 2,000 pounds or less not used 
in the business of carrying passengers for hire. 
8. Property damage means damage to or destruction 
of tangible property including resulting loss of use 
of that property. 
9. Relative means a person who resides with you and 
who is related to you by blood, marriage or 
adoption. Relative includes a ward or foster child 
who resides with you. 
10. Suit means a civil court proceeding in which dam-
ages because of bodily injury or property damage to 
which this insurance applies are alleged. 
11. Trailer means a utility trailer, camping or vacation 
trailer, truck trailer or semi-trailer. 
12. You or your means the first named insured shown 
in the Declarations and if an individual, your spouse 
who resides in the same household. 
13. Your automobile means the automobile described in 
the Declarations. 
14. We, us or our means the Company providing this 
insurance. 
1 
COVERAGE 
a. Liability Coverage - Bodily Injury and Property 
Damage 
We wil l pay damages for bodily injury and pro-
perty damage for which you become legally re-
sponsible because of or arising out of the 
ownership, maintenance or use of your auto-
mobile as an automobile. We wi l l pay such 
damages: 
(1) on your behalf; 
(2) on behalf of any relative using your auto-
mobile; 
(3) on behalf of any other person using your 
automobile with your permission; and 
(4) on behalf of any person or organization le-
gally responsible for the use of your auto-
mobile when used by you, a relative, or 
with your permission. 
We wil l settle or defend, as we consider appro-
priate, any claim or suit for damages covered 
by this policy. We wil l do this at our expense, 
using attorneys of our choice. This agreement 
to settle or defend claims or suits ends when 
we have paid the limit of our l iability. 
b. Trailers 
(1) The Liability Coverage provided for your 
automobile includes: 
(a) a trailer designed for use with a private 
passenger automobile; 
(b) a trailer with a load capacity of 2,000 
pounds or less; and 
(c) non-motorized farm machinery or a 
farm wagon; 
while used with your automobile, whether 
owned by you or someone else. 
A trailer described in (1)(a) or (1)(b) above 
does not have to be attached to your auto-
mobile. 
(2) Liability Coverage provided by b.(1) above 
to: 
(a) your trailer designed for use with a 
private passenger automobile; and 
(b) your trailer with a load capacity of 2000 
pounds or less; 
includes your l iability arising out of or re-
sulting from use of your trailer by a person 
or organization other than you. 
c. Other Automobiles Covered 
The Liability Coverage provided for your auto-
mobile also applies to certain other 
automobiles. It applies: 
(1) to an automobile you do not own which is 
temporari ly used as a substitute for your 
automobile. Your automobile must be out 
of use because of breakdown, repair, ser-
vicing, loss or destruction. The owner o f 
the substitute automobile is not covered. 
(2) to an automobile of the same type which 
you acquire after the inception date of the 
current policy term if: 
(a) it replaces your automobile. You must 
report the replacement automobile to 
us no later than the expiration date o f 
the policy term during which the auto-
mobile was acquired; or 
(b) it is an additional automobile and we 
insure all automobiles you already own 
provided you: 
1) report the additional automobile t o 
us within 30 days of delivery; and 
2) pay any required additional pre-
miums. 
This extension does not apply if you have 
other liability insurance that applies to the 
automobile you acquire. 
EXCLUSIONS 
Liability Coverage does not apply: 
a. to any person for bodily injury or property 
damage arising out of or resulting from an in -
tentional act of that person. 
b. to any person operating or employed by an au-
tomobile garage, repair shop, sales agency, 
service station or public parking place. This 
exclusion does not apply to: 
(1) you; 
(2) a relative; or 
(3) any person associated with or employed 
by you; 
while using your automobile in such business. 
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d. to any automobile while: 
(1) preparing for; 
(2) practicing for; or 
(3) participating in; 
any prearranged racing, speed or demolition 
contest. 
e. to your automobile when used with any trailer 
not covered for Liability Coverage by this policy. 
f. to your trailer when used with any automobile 
not covered for Liability Coverage by this policy. 
This exclusion does not apply to the coverage 
provided by 1.b.(2) above. 
g. to any person or organization with respect to 
the loading or unloading of your automobile. 
We will cover you or your employee or a lessee 
or borrower of your automobile or that person's 
employee. 
h. to any person or organization (or that person's 
or organization's agents, employees or con-
tractors) subject to the security requirements 
of any motor carrier law or regulation because 
of transporting property for you or for others. 
This exclusion does not apply to you. 
i. to liability which is assumed under any contract 
or agreement. This exclusion does not apply to 
such liability for damages that you: 
(1) assumed under a contract or agreement 
that is an insured contract; 
(2) would have in the absence of a contract or 
agreement; or 
(3) assumed in a private passenger automobile 
lease or rental agreement, provided you 
are an individual. 
j . to any person or organization for damage to 
property that person or organization is trans-
porting. This exclusion does not apply to liabil-
ity you have assumed under a sidetrack 
agreement. 
I. to any expenses that would be payable under 
any workers compensation law, unemployment 
compensation or disability benefits law or under 
any similar law. 
(1) bodily injury to a domestic employee when 
workers compensation benefits are not re-
quired or available; or 
(2) when such liability is assumed by you un-
der an insured contract. 
n. to your employee for claims brought against" 
him or her by another of your employees in-
jured on the job. 
o. to any person or organization for bodily injury 
to: 
(1) an employee of that person or organiza-
tion; or 
(2) a spouse, child, parent, brother or sister of 
the employee which results from the injury 
to the employee; 
when that injury arises out of and in the course 
of employment by that person or organization. 
This exclusion applies: 
(1) whether a claim is made against such per-
son or organization as employer or other-
wise; and 
(2) to any obligation to share damages with or 
repay another who must pay damages be-
cause of the injury. 
This exclusion does not apply to liability you 
have assumed under an insured contract. 
p. to bodily injury or property damage for which 
insurance is available under any nuclear ener-
gy liability policy. This exclusion applies even 
if the nuclear energy liability policy limits of li-
ability are exhausted. 
q. to bodily injury or property damage for which 
financial responsibility or liability insurance is 
required to be maintained under the Atomic 
Energy Act of 1954, as amended, or for which 
governmental indemnity is available. 
r. to liability for bodily injury or property damage 
caused by war, whether declared or not de-
clared, insurrection or any of their conse-
quences whether or not assumed under a 
contract or agreement. 
COVERAGE EXTENSIONS 
In addition to our limit of liability, we will also pay: 
a. premiums on appeal bonds in any suit we de-
fend. We will not apply for or furnish such 
bonds. 
k. to any person or organization for damage to 
property or an automobile owned by, rented to 
or in the care, custody or control of that person 3. 
or organization. 
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b. premiums on bonds to release attachments, but 
only for bond amounts that do not exceed the 
applicable limit of liability. We will not apply for 
or furnish such bonds. 
c. premiums on bail bonds required because of 
an accident or related traffic law violation, in-
volving your automobile during the policy peri-
od. We will not apply for or furnish such bonds. 
Our maximum payment is $250 per occurrence. 
d. interest on damages owed by you because of a 
judgment in a suit we defend and accruing: 
(1) after the judgment, and until we pay, offer 
or deposit in court, the amount for which 
we are liable under this policy; or 
(2) before the judgment, where owed by law, 
but only on that part of the judgment we 
pay. 
e. expenses you, a relative or a person using your 
automobile with your permission, incur for first 
aid to others at the time of an occurrence cov-
ered by this policy. 
f. all other reasonable expenses incurred at our 
request, including actual loss of earnings up to 
$100.00 per day. 
LIMIT OF LIABILITY 
We will pay damages for bodily injury or property 
damage up to the Limit of Liability stated in the 
Declarations as follows: 
a. Under bodily injury. 
(1) The limit stated for "each person" is the 
amount of coverage and the most we will 
pay for all damages because of or arising 
out of bodily injury to one person in any 
one occurrence. 
(2) The limit stated for "each occurrence" is 
the total amount of coverage and the most 
we will pay, subject to a.(1) above, for all 
damages because of or arising out of bodi-
ly injury to two or more persons in any one 
occurrence. 
b. Under property damage, the limit stated is the 
amount of coverage and the most we will pay 
ler 
for all claims of one or more persons or organ-
izations in any one occurrence. 
c. The Limit of Liability is not increased because 
of the number of: 
(1) automobiles shown or premiums charged 
in the Declarations; 
(2) claims made or suits brought; 
(3) persons injured; or 
(4) automobiles involved in the occurrence. 
d. An automobile and attached trailer are one au-
tomobile and do not increase the Limit of Li-
ability. 
5. FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND COMPULSORY 
INSURANCE LAWS 
While your automobile is subject to laws of anoth 
state or Canada, we will: 
a. increase the Limit of Liability for Liability Cov-
erage to comply with the minimum require-
ments of a financial responsibility or 
compulsory insurance law of the jurisdiction 
where your automobile is being operated; and 
b. afford the minimum amounts for the types of 
mandatory coverages required by the jurisdic-
tion where your automobile is being operated. 
This provision does not apply to any limits required 
by any law governing motor carriers of property or 
passengers. 
We will not duplicate payments available under this 
or any other insurance for the same elements of 
loss. 
6. OTHER INSURANCE 
If there is other collectible automobile liability in-
surance, we will pay only our share of the loss. Our 
share will be the ratio of the amount of this insur-
ance to the total amount of all collectible automobile 
liability insurance. The coverage extended to auto-
mobiles you do not own will be excess over any 
other insurance available to you. 
SECTION HI - DAMAGE TO YOUR AUTOMOBILE 
COVERAGES 
a. Fire Coverage 
We will pay for loss of or damage to your auto-
mobile and its equipment caused by: 
(1) fire or lightning. 
(2) smoke or smudge because of a sudden, 
unusual or faulty operation of any fixed 
heating equipment where your automobile 
is stored. 
(3) windstorm, hail, earthquake, explosion, ex-
ternal discharge or leakage of water. We 
cover damage resulting from the stranding, 
any ei |ui | j i i ieni uemi, ^eu 10 i ranspon 
your automobile on lana or water. We will 
also pay for general average and salvage 
charges for which you may be legally re-
sponsible. 
Theft Coverage 
We will pay for loss of or damage to your auto-
mobile and its equipment caused by theft, lar-
ceny, robbery or pilferage. We cover your loss 
when you are tricked into giving your automo-
bile to another person. 
Comprehensive Coverage 
We will pay for loss of or damage to your auto-
mobile and its equipment from any cause ex-
cept upset or collision with another object or 
with a vehicle to which it is attached. 
We will also pay for: 
(1) glass breakage from any cause including 
upset or collision; 
(2) damage caused by missiles or falling ob-
jects; and 
(3) damage caused by collision with an animal 
or bird. 
When a deductible is indicated in the Declara-
tions for this coverage, we will reduce our pay-
ment by that amount. 
Collision Coverage 
We will pay for loss of or damage to your auto-
mobile and its equipment caused by accidental 
collision with another object or by accidental 
upset. 
When a deductible is indicated in the Declara-
tions for this coverage, we will reduce our pay-
ment by that amount. If your automobile is a 
private passenger automobile, the deductible 
does not always apply. It does not apply in a 
collision with another automobile: 
(1) we insure and which you do not own, rent 
or have in your care, custody or control; or 
(2) whose owner or operator has been identi-
fied; and 
(a) is legally responsible for the entire 
amount of the damage; and 
./ policy or bond; 
but only if the damage exceeds the deduc-
tible amount. 
e. Road Trouble Service 
We will reimburse you up to the amount stated 
in the Declarations for this coverage in any one 
emergency: 
(1) for towing your automobile to the nearest 
available garage; and 
(2) for the cost of labor performed on your au-
tomobile at the place of the emergency. 
f. Other Automobiles Covered 
The Damage To Your Automobile Coverages 
provided for your automobile also apply to cer-
tain other automobiles. They apply: 
(1) to an automobile you do not own which is 
temporarily used as a substitute for your 
automobile. Your automobile must be out 
of use because of breakdown, repair, ser-
vicing, loss or destruction. 
(2) to an automobile of the same type which 
you acquire after the inception date of the 
current policy term subject to the following: 
(a) If the automobile replaces your auto-
mobile, we will apply only those cov-
erages that apply to the automobile 
being replaced. You must report the 
replacement automobile to us no later 
than the expiration date of the policy 
term during which the automobile was 
acquired. 
(b) If the automobile is an additional auto-
mobile and we insure all automobiles 
you already own, we will apply only 
those coverages which are common to 
all of your automobiles we insure pro-
vided you: 
1) report the additional automobile to 
us within 30 days of delivery; and 
2) pay any required additional pre-
miums. 
These extensions do not apply when there is 
other insurance covering your interest or the 
interest of the owner. However, paragraph f.(1) 
above applies if you are legally liable. 
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EXCLUSIONS 
Fire, Theft, Comprehensive and Collision Coverages 
do not apply to: 
a. loss of or damage to your automobile because 
of confiscation or destruction by any civil or 
governmental authorities because of illegal ac-
tivities engaged in by: 
(1) you; or 
(2) a relative. 
This exclusion does not apply to a loss payee's 
interest in your automobile. 
b. loss of or damage to your automobile because 
of or arising out of your intentional act or an 
intentional act committed at your direction or 
with your knowledge. This exclusion does not 
apply to a loss payee's interest in your auto-
mobile. 
c. conversion, embezzlement or secretion by any 
person lawfully having your automobile under 
a sale, lease or similar agreement. 
d. any automobile while: 
(1) preparing for; 
(2) practicing for; or 
(3) participating in; 
any prearranged racing speed or demolition 
contest. 
e. loss of use, except as provided in Coverage 
Extensions. 
f. wear and tear, freezing, mechanical or elec-
trical breakdown, other than burning of wiring, 
unless this damage follows and results from 
other loss or damage covered by this policy. 
g. tires, unless the loss or damage is caused by: 
(1) fire; 
(2) theft; or 
(3) malicious mischief; or 
is part of other damage covered by this policy. 
(1) that is not attached to your automobile; and 
(2) is not receiving its power from your auto-
mobile's electrical system. 
i. stereo tapes, cassettes, discs or cartridges or 
•»£*lo+*irl i l o m c 
j . any caddy, case or container designed for stor-
ing or carrying stereo tapes, cassettes, discs 
or cartridges. 
k. unless described in the Declarations and a 
premium charged: 
(1) a camper body; or 
(2) a pickup cover with built-in cooking and 
sleeping equipment. 
I. A citizens-band radio, mobile or cellular tele-
phone, television or other similar device for 
sending or receiving communications, including 
related items. However, these devices are 
covered if: 
(1) standard or optional equipment from the 
manufacturer of your automobile for that 
make, model and model year; 
(2) permanently installed in the dash or con-
sole opening designed for such equipment; 
or 
(3) described in the Declarations and a premi-
um charged. 
m. a radio, stereo, stereo tape deck, compact disc 
player or other similar device designed for the 
reproduction of sound, including related items. 
However these devices are covered if: 
(1) standard or optional equipment from the 
manufacturer of your automobile for that 
make, model and model year; or 
(2) permanently installed in your automobile. 
Our liability under m.(2) above shall not exceed 
$1000 unless a greater amount is shown in the 
Declarations and a premium charged. 
n. Any device designed or used to detect or locate 
radar or any other speed measuring or calcu-
lating apparatus. 
o. radioactive contamination. 
p. loss caused by: 
(1) declared or undeclared war or insurrection; 
or 
(2) explosion of a nuclear weapon or its con-
sequences. 
COVERAGE EXTENSIONS 
a. Trailers 
The Damage To Your Automobile Coverages 
provided to your automobile extend to certain 
trailers you do not own. The trailer must: 
(1) be designed for use with a private passen-
h. a stereo tape or disc player: 
Due; ana 
(3) be other than a trailer of the home, office, 
store, display, or passenger type. 
Our limit of liability for all loss and damage un-
der this coverage extension is $500 in any one 
occurrence. 
b. Loss Of Use By Theft 
Under Theft Coverage or Comprehensive Cov-. 
erage, we will reimburse you for transportation 
expenses if your private passenger automobile 
is stolen. We will pay up to $10 per day but not 
more than $300 in one occurrence. We will pay 
such expenses incurred beginning 48 hours af-
ter you report the theft to us and to the police 
and ending when your automobile is returned 
to use or we pay for its loss. 
c. Transportation Cost 
Under the coverages for Damage To Your Au-
tomobile we will reimburse you for expenses 
you incur for transportation from where your 
automobile was disabled to your home or in-
tended destination. The maximum payment is 
$25 for each occurrence. 
d. Personal Property 
If your automobile is a private passenger auto-
mobile, we will extend the Comprehensive 
Coverage and the Collision Coverage that apply 
to your automobile to loss of or damage to per-
sonal property contained in or on your automo-
bile. This coverage extension is subject to the 
following: 
(1) The personal property must be owned by 
you, a relative, or your employee. 
(2) Comprehensive Coverage is extended only 
for loss or damage because of: 
(a) fire; 
(b) lightning; 
(c) theft or attempted theft. 
Unless the entire automobile is stolen, 
there must be visible signs of someone 
breaking into the automobile for (2)(c) 
above to apply. 
(3) This coverage extension does not apply to: 
(a) stereo tapes, cassettes, discs or car-
tridges or related items. 
(b) a citizens-band radio, mobile or cellu-
lar telephone, television or other simi-
lar device for sending or receiving 
communications, including related 
items. 
,jaci aisc piayer or oiner simnar 
o«~/ice designed for the reproduction 
of sound, including related items. 
(d) property used in a business, trade or 
profession. 
(e) money or jewelry. 
(f) any device designed or used to detect 
or locate radar or any other speed 
measuring or calculating apparatus. 
(g) property specifically insured. 
(4) Our limit of liability for all loss or damage 
under this coverage extension is $200 in 
any one occurrence. 
LIMIT OF LIABILITY 
a. We will pay no more than the lowest of the fol-
lowing: 
(1) the actual cash value of stolen or damaged 
property; 
(2) the necessary cost, at local prices, to re-
pair or replace the property or damaged 
parts with material of similar kind and 
quality; or 
(3) the Limit of Liability stated in the Declara-
tions. 
b. We will, at our option, replace your automobile 
with a new one of equal value or pay you your 
original purchase price if: 
(1) your automobile is a private passenger au-
tomobile; 
(2) you purchased it new; 
(3) we determine the loss or damage can not 
be repaired; and 
(4) the loss or damage occurs within 90 days 
of the purchase date. 
c. Your automobile may have been altered, re-
modeled, converted or modified so that its val-
ue is substantially increased over that of a 
standard automobile of the same make and 
model. In that case, we will pay only a propor-
tional share of any loss or damage. We will pay 
the proportion that the value of a standard au-
tomobile bears to the value of your automobile. 
This applies only when alteration, remodeling, 
conversion or modification affects the amount 
of the loss. It does not apply when an additional 
premium is charged based on the increased 
value. 
d. If a loss can be paid under either Comprehen-
sive or Collision Coverage, payment will be 
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made under the coverage that pays you the 
most. 
SECTION IV - INDIVIDUAL NAMED INSURED 
the first named insured in the Declarations is an indivi 
rivate passenger automobile the following extensions of 
LIABILITY COVERAGE 
PERTY DAMAGE 
BODILY INJURY AND PRO-
a. The Liability Coverage provided for your auto-
mobile also applies to an automobile not: 
(1) owned by or furnished or available for reg-
ular use to you or anyone living with you. 
However, we will cover your liability for 
your use of an automobile owned by or 
furnished for the regular use of a relative. 
(2) used in an automobile garage repair shop, 
sales agency, service station or public 
parking business you own or operate. 
b. We extend this coverage only: 
(1) to you; 
(2) to relatives who do not own an automobile; 
and 
(3) to anyone legally responsible for the use 
of the automobile by the persons in (1) and 
(2) above. 
c. We do not cover: 
(1) the owner of the automobile, but when we 
cover a trailer used with the automobile, 
we cover the owner of that trailer. 
(2) an automobile used in your business or 
occupation or that of a relative, unless it is: 
(a) a private passenger automobile; and 
dual and the automobile described in the Declarations is a 
coverage apply. 
(b) used by you, such relative or the 
chauffeur or household employee of 
either. 
(3) you or a relative using an automobile with-
out a reasonable belief of permission to do 
so. 
2. DAMAGE TO YOUR AUTOMOBILE 
a. The Damage To Your Automobile Coverages 
provided for your automobile also apply to an 
automobile not: 
(1) owned by or furnished or available for reg-
ular use to you or anyone living with you. 
(2) used in an automobile garage, repair shop, 
sales agency, service station or public 
parking business you own or operate. 
b. We extend this coverage only: 
(1) to you; and 
(2) to relatives who do not own an automobile. 
c. We do not cover an automobile used in your 
business or occupation or that of a relative un-
less it is: 
(1) a private passenger automobile; and 
(2) used by you, such relative, or the chauffeur 
or household employee of either. 
d. These extensions do not apply when there is 
other insurance covering your interest or the 
interest of the owner. However, they do apply 
if you are legally liable. 
SECTION V - WHAT YOU MUST DO AFTER AN ACCIDENT OR LOSS 
NOTIFY US PROMPTLY 
a. You and any person seeking coverage under 
this policy must notify us promptly as to how, 
when and where the accident happened. We 
must have the names and addresses of any in-
jured person and of any witnesses. Notice and 
documentation of loss must be given if we re-
quire it. Any loss or damage caused by theft, 
larceny, robbery, pilferage or trickery must be 
promptly reported to the police. 
b, If claim is made or suit is brought against you 
or any person entitled to coverage, we must be 
advised promptly. All papers in connection with 
c. Under Uninsured Motorist Coverage and/or 
Underinsured Motorist Coverage, any person 
making claim must: 
(1) give us written notice and documentation 
of loss; 
(2) submit to examinations by pnysicians we 
select as often as we require; and 
(3) authorize us to obtain medical reports and 
other pertinent records. 
We must be given copies of the legal papers if 
suit is brought against any person believed to 
a. TUU ana any person seek..,g coverage under 
this policy must cooperate with us in the inves-
tigation, settlement or defense of any claim or 
suit. This includes submitting to a statement 
under oath and giving us access to any docu-
ments which we request. 
b. When a claim is made for damage to your au-
tomobile, you must let us examine the vehicle 
before repairs are made or evidence of loss 
removed. 
c. Following damage to your automobile, every 
reasonable effort must be made to protect the 
vehicle against further loss. We will pay the 
reasonable expenses incurred to do this. 
a. If we makw a payment under this policy and the 
person to or for whom payment is made-has a 
right to recover damages from another, we will 
be entitled to that right. That person shall do 
everything necessary to transfer that right to us 
and shall do nothing to prejudice it. 
b. The person to or for whom payment is made 
under Uninsured Motorist Coverage and/or 
Underinsured Motorist Coverage must hold in 
trust for us his rights of recovery against any 
legally liable person. He must do all that is 
proper to secure such rights and must do noth-
ing to prejudice them. He must take any re-
quired action in his name to recover damages 
and reimburse us out of any proceeds to the 
extent of our payment. 
SECTION VI - GENERAL CONDITIONS 
POLICY PERIOD AND TERRITORY 
This policy applies only to accidents and losses 
which happen during the policy period as shown in 
the Declarations. They must take place within the 
United States of America, its territories or pos-
sessions, Canada or Mexico or between their ports. 
CHANGES 
a. This policy contains all the agreements be-
tween you and us or any of our agents relating 
to this insurance, the terms of this policy may 
not be changed except by written endorsement 
issued by us. 
b. We may adjust your premium during the policy 
term because of changes in the factors that 
were used to determine such premium. These 
factors include but are not limited to: 
(1) the principal place of garaging your auto-
mobile; 
(2) coverages, limits of liability and deduct-
ibles; 
(3) the type, make and model of your automo-
bile and its use; 
(4) the operators of your automobile. 
Premium adjustments will be made at the time 
of such changes or when we become aware of 
the changes, if later. We will use the governing 
rules and rates in effect on the inception date 
of the policy term. 
3. FRAUD 
We will not cover any person seeking coverage un-
der this policy who has made fraudulent statements 
or engaged in fraudulent conduct with respect to 
procurement of this policy or to any occurrence for 
which coverage is sought. 
4. LEGAL ACTION AGAINST US 
a. No legal action may be brought against us until 
there has been full compliance with all the 
terms of this policy. Further, under the Liability 
Coverage no legal action may be brought until 
we agree a person entitled to coverage has an 
obligation to pay or until the amount of that ob-
ligation has been determined by judgement af-
ter trial. No one has any right under this policy 
to bring us into any action to determine the li-
ability of any person we have agreed to protect. 
b. Bankruptcy or insolvency of any person we 
have agreed to protect will not relieve us of any 
obligation under the terms of this policy. 
5. SEVERABILITY 
Except as to our limit of liability, the coverage pro-
vided by this policy applies separately to each per-
son against whom claim is made or suit is brought. 
6. DUPLICATION OF COVERAGE 
a. If this policy and any other policy or form of 
coverage provided by us or a company affiliated 
with us, provide coverage for the same loss or 
damage, our maximum limit of liability under 
all the policies or forms of coverage shall not 
exceed the highest limit of liability under any 
single policy or form of coverage applicable to 
the loss or damage. 
b. This condition does not apply to any policy or 
form of coverage issued by us or a company 
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affiliated with us to specifically provide excess 
insurance over this policy. 
ASSIGNMENT 
No interest in this policy may be assigned without 
our written consent. But, if you should die within the 
policy term, the policy will cover as though named 
in the Declarations: 
a. your spouse, if you are an individual; 
b. your legal representative but only with respect 
to his legal responsibility for the maintenance 
or use of your automobile; and 
c. any person having proper temporary custody 
of your automobile until a legal representative 
is appointed; 
provided we are given written notice of your death 
within 60 days, this requirement does not apply with 
regard to your spouse. 
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It is agreed: 
1. SECTION II - LIABILITY COVERAGE; 1. COVERAGE; a. Liability Coverage - Bodily Injury and Property Damage 
extends to an automobile you hire, lease or borrow for use in your business. This coverage extension does not 
apply to: 
a. any automobile: 
(1) you own; 
(2) owned by your executive officers or partners; or 
(3) you lease while that automobile: 
(a) is leased to you in writing in accordance with a written agreement in which the lessor holds you 
harmless; and 
(b) is used pursuant to operating rights (permits) granted to you by a public authority; 
b. the owner of an automobile you hire, lease or borrow or the owner's agents or employees; 
c. a lessee from whom you sublease an automobile or the lessee's agents or employees; or 
d. any automobile covered elsewhere by this insurance or any of its extensions. 
2. SECTION II - LIABILITY COVERAGE; 1. COVERAGE, b. Trailers and c. Other Automobiles Covered; and 3. COV-
ERAGE EXTENSIONS are deleted. 
3. The following conditions apply in addition to those contained in SECTION VI - GENERAL CONDITIONS of the pol-
icy. 
a. Premium 
(1) The premium stated in the Declarations for this coverage extension is provisional. We shall compute the 
earned premium for each policy term on the basis of the total cost ycu incur to hire automobiles during 
that term. We shall use the rate for the coverage in effect on the inception date of the term. 
(2) Additional premium will be charged or a refund made, whichever is appropriate. However, we shall re-
tain the minimum premium for this coverage extension. 
b. Examination of Your Books and Records 
We may examine and audit your books and records to determine the premium for this coverage at anytime: 
(1) during the policy term, and 
(2) within one year after the expiration of this insurance. 
c. OTHER INSURANCE 
This coverage extension is excess of any other available insurance. 
All other terms and conditions of the policy apply. 
w v / i v i D I I H C U L I M l I U h L I A b l L I l I 79539^(6-9: 
Automobile Policy 
It is agreed: 
When Combined Liability is shown under Coverages in the Declarations, SECTION II - LIABILITY COVERAGE, 4, LIMl" 
OF LIABILITY is deleted and replaced by the following: 
4. LIMIT OF LIABILITY 
a. We will pay damages for bodily injury and property damage up to the Limit of Liability stated in the Declara 
tions. The Limit of Liability is the amount of coverage and the most we will pay for all damages because o 
or arising out of: 
1) ail bodily injury; and 
2) all property damage; 
in any one occurrence. 
b. The Limit of Liability is not increased because of the number of: 
1) automobiles shown or premiums charged in the Declarations; 
2) claims made or suits brought; 
3) persons injured; or 
4) automobiles involved in the occurrence. 
c. An automobile and attached trailer are one automobile and do not increase the Limit of Liability. 
All other policy terms and conditions apply. 
Automobile Policy 
It is agreed: 
SECTION II - LIABILITY COVERAGE does not apply to bodily injury sustained by any person: 
1. while in or upon; or 
2. getting into, out of, on to or off of; 
your automobile that is a motorcycle, motor scooter or motorized bicycle. 
All other policy terms and conditions apply. 
79355 (1-9 
NO-FAULT INSURANCE ENDORSEMENT 
It is agreed* 
SECTION I - DEFINITIONS 
The following definitions apply to this endorsement. Definitions contained in the policy do not apply to this endorse 
ment 
1. Elimination period means the 3 days following the motor vehicle accident. 
2. Injured person means: 
a. you, when injured in an accident involving any motorized vehicle, except when the injury is the result of the 
use or operation of a motor vehicle you own that is not insured by this endorsement; 
b. a relative, when injured in an accident involving any motor vehicle, except when the injury is the result of the 
use or operation of a motor vehicle owned by the injured relative that is not insured by this endorsement; 
and 
c. any other natural person whose injuries arise out of a motor vehicle accident: 
(1) while occupying the insured motor vehicle wi th your express or implied consent; or 
(2) while a pedestrian, if the accident involves the insured motor vehicle and occurs in the State of Utah 
3. Injury means physical injury, sickness or disease sustained by a person including resulting death of that person. 
4. Insured motor vehicle means a motor vehicle* 
a. to which the bodily injury liability insurance of the policy and personal injury protection coverage of this en-
dorsement apply; and 
b. for which you are required to maintain the owner 's or operator 's security required by the State of Utah. 
5. Motor vehicle means every self-propelled vehicle that is designed for use upon a highway, including trailers and 
semi-trai lers designed for use with such motorized vehicles. Motor vehicle does not include traction engines, 
road rollers, farm tractors, tractor cranes, power shovels, and well dril lers and every vehicle that is propelled by 
electric power obtained from overhead wires but not operated upon rails. 
6. Occupying means being in or on a motor vehicle as a passenger or operator, or being engaged in the immediate 
acts of entering, boarding or alighting from a motor vehicle. 
7. Operator means every person who is in actual physical control of a motor vehicle. 
8. Pedestrian means any natural person not occupying a motor vehicle. 
9. Relative means a person who resides with you and who is related to you by blood, marriage or adoption or who 
is your ward or foster child. Relative includes such person who usually resides in your household but temporarily 
lives elsewhere 
10. We, us or our means the Company providing this insurance 
11. You o r your means the first natural person or organizat ion named in the Declarations. 
SECTION II - PERSONAL INJURY PROTECTION 
1. COVERAGE 
a. We will pay personal injury protection benefits to or for an injured person who sustains accidental injury 
arising out of the operation or use of a motor vehicle as a vehicle. 
b. Personal injury protection benefits shall consist o f 
(1) medical expenses benefits meaning the reasonable value of all expenses for necessary medical, surgi-
cal, x-ray, dental and rehabilitation services, including. 
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(c) hospital and nursing services; and 
(d) nonremedial care and treatment rendered in accordance with a recognized religious method < 
healing. 
(2) loss of income and earning capacity of an injured person from an inability to work for a maximum perio 
of 52 consecutive weeks beginning three days after the date of the loss of income and earning capacity 
If the disability continues for longer than two consecutive weeks after the date of loss, the eliminatio 
period shall be waived. 
(3) an allowance for services actually rendered or expenses reasonably incurred for services that, but fc 
the injury, the injured person would have performed for his or her household for a maximum period c 
365 days beginning three days after the date of the accident. If the disability continues for longer tha 
two consecutive weeks after the date of injury, the elimination period shall be waived. 
(4) funeral, burial or cremation benefits. 
(5) compensation for death of an injured person, payable to the injured person's personal representative fo 
the benefit of his or her heirs. 
EXCLUSIONS 
We will not pay personal injury protection benefits because of injury: 
a. sustained by the injured person while occupying a motor vehicle owned by or furnished to or available foi 
regular use by the injured person or any relative of such injured person, if the motor vehicle is not an insurec 
motor vehicle. 
b. to any person while operating the insured motor vehicle without the express or implied consent of you or a 
relative or while not in lawful possession of the insured motor vehicle. 
c. to any person, if that person's conduct contributes to his or her injury by intentionally causing the injury tc 
himself or herself or while committing a felony. 
d. to any person arising out of the use of any motor vehicle while located for use as a residence or premises. 
e. to any person because of war, whether or not declared, civil war, insurrection, rebellion or revolution, or any 
act or condition incident to any of the preceding. 
f. to the owner, operator or occupant of a motorcycle, trailer or semitrailer, if such injury occurs while operating 
or occupying any of these vehicles. 
g. to any person resulting from radioactive, toxic, explosive or other hazardous properties of nuclear materials. 
h. to any person sustained as a pedestrian, if the accident takes place outside the State of Utah. This exclusion 
does not apply to you or a relative. 
LIMITS OF LIABILITY 
a. Our liability for payment of personal injury protection benefits to or for any one injured person for injury be-
cause of or arising out of any one accident shall not exceed the following: 
(1) S3,000 for medical expenses. If a larger amount is shown in the Declarations,, we will pay up to that 
amount. 
(2) 85% of loss of income and earning capacity, subject to a maximum of S250 per week. 
(3) S20 per day for household services the injured person would have performed. 
(4) $1,500 for incurred funeral, burial or cremation expenses. 
(5) A total of $3,000 for death of the injured person. 
b. The amount we pay shall be reduced by: 
(1) any benefits the injured person receives or is entitled to receive under any workers' compensation or 
similar statutory plan; and 
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1. ACTION AGAINST US 
No legal action may be brought against us until there has been full compliance with all the terms of this coverage. 
2. NOTICE 
In the event of an accident, written notice containing particulars sufficient to identify the injured person, and also 
reasonably obtainable information respecting the time, place and circumstances of the accident shall be given 
by or on behalf of each injured person to us or any of our authorized agents as soon as practicable. 
If an injured person, his or her legal representative or his or her dependent survivors shall institute legal action 
to recover damages for injury against a person or organization who is or may be liable, a copy of the summons 
and complaint or other process served in connection with such legal action shall be forwarded to us as soon as 
practicable by the injured person, his or her legal representative or his or her survivors. 
3. MEDICAL REPORTS and PROOF OF CLAIM 
As soon as practicable, the injured person or someone on his or her behalf shall give to us written proof of claim, 
under oath if required, including full particulars of the nature and extent of the injury, treatment and rehabilitation 
received and contemplated, and such other information as may assist us in determining the amount due and 
payable. The injured person shall submit to physical and mental examination by physicians selected by us when 
and as often as we may reasonably require. We shall pay for such examinations. 
4. NON-DUPLICATION AND COORDINATION 
Coverage afforded by this endorsement is primary coverage for only injury sustained by an injured person in an 
accident arising out of the operation or use of the insured motor vehicle as a vehicle. 
No injured person shall recover duplicate benefits for the same elements of loss under this or any similar insur-
ance, including approved plans of self-insurance. If an injured person has other similar insurance that is available 
and applicable to the accident, that total amount recoverable shall not exceed the amount payable under the 
provisions of the insurance providing the highest dollar limit. "We shall not be liable for an amount greater than 
the proportion that our limit of liability bears to the sum of the limits of liability of all applicable insurance that 
applies on the same basis. 
5. SUBROGATION 
In the event of any payment under the provisions of this endorsement, we are subrogated to the rights of the 
person to whom or for whose benefit the payments were made to the extent of those payments. That person must 
do everything necessary to secure such rights, do nothing to prejudice those rights, and shall execute and deliver 
to us instruments and papers necessary to secure his or her rights and obligations under this provision. Any 
recovery shall go first to the injured person for any unpaid loss, then to us. 
All other policy terms and conditions apply. 
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Automobile Policy 
agreed: 
DEFINITIONS 
The following definitions apply in addition to those contained in SECTION I - DEFINITIONS of the policy. 
a. Occupying means being in or on an automobile as a passenger or operator, or being engaged in the imme-
diate acts of entering, boarding or alighting from an automobile. 
b. Pedestrian means any natural person who is not occupying an automobile. 
c. Underinsured automobile means an automobile to which a liability bond or policy applies at the time of the 
occurrence, however, the limit of liability is less than the amount of compensatory damages the injured 
person is legally entitled to recover for bodily injury. 
Underinsured automobile does not include an automobile: 
(1) owned by or furnished to or available for regular use by you or a relative; 
(2) owned by any governmental unit or agency; 
(3) located for use as a residence or premises; 
(4) that is designed for use primarily off public roads except while actually on public roads; 
(5) that is an uninsured automobile. Uninsured automobile means an automobile: 
(a) the operation, maintenance and use of which is not covered by a liability bond or policy at the time 
of the occurrence. 
(b) the operation, maintenance and use of which is covered by a liability bond or policy at the time of 
the occurrence but the limits are less than: 
(1) $25,000 because of liability for bodily injury to one person in any one occurrence; 
(2) subject to (1) above, $50,000 because of liability for bodily injury to two or more persons in any 
one occurrence; and 
(3) $15,000 because of liability for property damage in any one occurrence; or 
(4) $65,000 in any one occurrence whether arising from bodily injury or property damage. 
However, such automobile is uninsured only to the extent of the deficiency. 
(c) insured by a company that is or becomes insolvent. However, such automobile is uninsured only 
to the extent that the claim against the insurer is not paid by a guaranty association or fund. 
(d) insured by a company that has issued a successful written denial of coverage. 
(e) that is a hit and run automobile. By this we mean an automobile that causes bodily injury: 
1) by direct physical contact with the injured person or the automobile the injured person is oc-
cupying; or 
2) without direct physical contact with the injured person or the automobile the injured person is 
occupying; 
and whose owner or operator is unknown. 
If there is no direct physical contact, the injured person must show existence of the uninsured au-
tomobile by clear and convincing evidence consisting of more than the injured person's testimony. 
(f) owned or operated by a self-insurer under any motor vehicle law provided such self-insurer is or 
becomes insolvent and cannot provide the minimum amounts required by that motor vehicle law. 
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v./ iivjui uic uwner ur • jraior or an undermsured automobile; 
(2) for bodily injury sustained while occupying an automobile that is covered by SECTION II - LIABILITY 
COVERAGE of the policy. 
b. If the first named insured in the Declarations is an individual, this coverage is extended as follows: 
(1) We will pay compensator/ damages you are legally entitled to recover: 
(a) from the owner or operator of any underinsured automobile; 
(b) for bodily injury you sustain: 
1) when you are a pedestrian; or 
2) while occupying an automobile you do not own which is not covered by SECTION II - LIABILITY 
COVERAGE of the policy. 
(2) The coverage extended in (1) above is also afforded to a relative who does not own an automobile. 
c. The bodily injury must be accidental and arise out of the ownership, maintenance or use of the underinsured 
automobile. 
d. Whether an injured person is legally entitled to recover damages and the amount of the damages shall be 
determined by agreement between the injured person and us. We will not be bound by any judgments for 
damages obtained or settlements made without our written consent. 
EXCLUSIONS 
Underinsured Motorist Coverage does not apply: 
a. to punitive or exemplary damages. 
b. when the first named insured in the Declarations is an individual: 
(1) to you while occupying or when struck by any automobile owned by you, if the automobile is not insured 
for underinsured motorist coverage by the policy. 
(2) to a relative while occupying or when struck by any automobile owned by that relative, if the automobile 
is not insured for underinsured motorist coverage by the policy. 
(3) to a relative while occupying or when struck by any automobile owned by you, if the automobile is in-
sured for underinsured motorist coverage on a primary basis by any other policy. 
c. to any person while occupying any automobile owned by you, if the automobile is not insured for underin-
sured motorist coverage by the policy. 
d. to any person who settles a bodily injury claim without our written consent. 
e. to directly or indirectly benefit an insurer or self-insurer under any workers compensation, disability benefits 
or similar law. 
LIMIT OF LIABILITY 
We will pay compensatory damages for bodily injury up to the Limit of Liability stated in the Declarations as fol-
lows: 
a. The limit stated for "each person" is the amount of coverage and the most we will pay for all compensatory 
damages because of or arising out of bodily injury to one person in any one occurrence. 
b. The limit stated for "each occurrence" is the total amount of coverage and the most we will pay, subject to 
a. above, for all compensatory damages because of or arising out of bodily injury to two or more persons 
in any one occurrence. 
c. If you or a relative sustains bodily injury while not occupying an automobile, the applicable limit of liability 
available may equal but shall not exceed the highest limit of liability for underinsured motorist coverage 
applying to any one automobile for which the injured person is an insured. 
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(i) the limit of liability explicable to the automobile the injured person was occupying at the time of the oc 
currence; and 
(2) the highest limit of liability for underinsured motorist coverage afforded by a policy that insures you 01 
the relative. 
e. Except as provided in d. above, the limits of liability for two or more automobiles may not be added together, 
combined or stacked to determine the amount of coverage available for bodily injury sustained by any injured 
person in any one occurrence regardless of the number of: 
(1) policies involved; 
(2) automobiles involved; 
(3) persons insured; 
(4) claims made or suits brought; 
(5) automobiles or premiums shown in the Declarations; or 
(6) premiums paid. 
f. The amount we pay will not duplicate any amounts paid or payable for the same bodily injury: 
(1) under SECTION II - LIABILITY COVERAGE of the policy; 
(2) under any workers compensation, disability benefits or similar law; or 
(3) by or on behalf of any person or organization who may be legally responsible for the bodily injury. 
OTHER INSURANCE 
a. If this insurance and other insurance applies on a primary basis, we will pay our share. Our share shall be 
the ratio of our limit of liability to the total of all limits which apply on a primary basis. 
b. If this insurance and other insurance applies on an excess basis, we will pay our share. Our share shall be 
the ratio of our limit of liability to total of all limits which apply on an excess basis. 
c. The insurance we extend to automobiles you do not own shall apply as excess over any other insurance that 
applies on a primary basis. 
CONDITIONS 
The following conditions apply in addition to those contained in the SECTION VI - GENERAL CONDITIONS of the 
policy. 
a. TIME LIMITATION FOR ACTION AGAINST US 
Any person seeking Underinsured Motorist Coverage must present a claim for compensatory damages: 
(1) according to the terms and conditions of the policy; and 
(2) within four years from the date of the occurrence. 
b. ARBITRATION 
(1) If we and a person entitled to Underinsured Motorist Coverage under this endorsement do not agree: 
(a) that the person is entitled to recover compensatory damages; or 
(b) to the amount of those damages; 
the matter may be arbitrated provided both we and the injured person agree to arbitration. If so, each 
party will select an arbitrator. The two arbitrators will select a third. If they cannot agree within 30 days, 
either may request that a judge of a court having jurisdiction make the selection. 
(2) Each party will pay its own arbitrator and share equally all other expenses of arbitration. 
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of competent \uriso.t.ion. 
All other policy terms and conditions apply. 
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COLLISION COVERAGE AMENDATORY ENuORSEMENT 79282 02-* 
Automobile Policy 
It is agreed: 
SECTION III - DAMAGE TO YOUR AUTOMOBILE, 1. COVERAGES, d. Collision Coverage is deleted and replaced by th< 
following: 
d. Collision Coverage 
We will pay for loss or damage to your automobile and its equipment caused by accidental collision with anothei 
object or by accidental upset. 
When a deductible is indicated in the Declarations for this coverage, we will reduce our payment by that amount, 
If your automobile is a private passenger automobile, the deductible does not always apply. The deductible shall 
not apply: 
(1) in a collision with another automobile: 
(a) we insure and which you do not own-, rent or have in your care, custody or control; or 
(b) whose owner or operator has been identified; and 
1) is legally responsible for the entire amount of the damage; and 
2) is covered by a property damage liability policy or bond; 
but only if the damage exceeds the deductible amount. 
(2) to your legally parked private passenger automobile in the event it is accidentally struck by another of your 
private passenger automobiles, provided Collision Coverage applies to both such automobiles. 
All other policy terms and conditions apply. 
Utah 79365(1-97) 
UNINS JRED MOTORIST COVERAGE AMENDMENT 
Automobile Policy 
It is agreed: 
If you are engaged in the business of or accept payment for, transporting natural persons by automobile or are a 
school district that provides transportation services for its pupils: 
1. the uninsured motorist coverage provided is secondary to any other insurance covering the injured person; and 
2. the uninsured motorist coverage provided does not apply to an employee whose exclusive remedy is provided 
by Title 35, Chapter 1, Workers' Compensation. 
All other policy terms and conditions apply. 
Utah 79360 (1-97) 
AMENDATORY ENDORSEMENT 
Automobile Policy 
It is agreed: 
1. Under SECTION I - DEFINITIONS, 9. Relative is deleted and replaced by the following: 
9. Relative means a person who resides with you and who is related to you by blood, marriage or adoption or 
who is your ward or foster child. Relative includes such person who usually resides in your household but 
temporarily lives elsewhere. 
2. Under SECTION V - WHAT YOU MUST DO AFTER AN ACCIDENT OR LOSS, 1. NOTIFY US PROMPTLY, a. is deleted 
and replaced by the following: 
a. You and any person seeking coverage under this policy must notify us promptly as to how, when and where 
the accident happened. We must have the names and addresses of any injured person and of any witnesses. 
Notice given by or on behalf of you or any person seeking coverage or making claim to any authorized 
agency of ours within Utah, with particulars sufficient to identify the policy, shall be considered to be notice 
to us. Notice and documentation of loss must be given if we require it. Any loss or damage caused by theft, 
larceny, robbery, pilferage or trickery must be promptly reported to the police. 
Failure to provide notice or proof of loss within the time limit specified by us does not invalidate the claim if 
you or the person seeking coverage can show that it was not reasonably possible to file the notice or proof 
of loss within the prescribed time limit. This paragraph also applies to Uninsured Motorist Coverage and/or 
Underinsured Motorist Coverage. 
All other policy terms and conditions apply. 
ROAD CONSTR JTION, MAINTENANCE AND SOCIAL EQUIPMENT
 79S17 (6. 
Automobile Policy 
It is agreed: 
1. SECTION II - LIABILITY COVERAGE applies to any: 
a. road grader, road oiler, road rol ler or road scraper: 
b. asphalt spreader, tar spreader or concrete mixer: 
c. crane, steam shovel or gas shovel ; 
d. ditch o r trench digger; 
e. air compressor, sandblasting or building surface cleaning machinery, septic tank cleaning or vacuum clea 
ing equipment; 
f. tree or other spraying equipment: 
g. snow plow or loader; 
h. welding apparatus or well dr i l l ing machinery; or 
incapable o f moving under its own power while towed by your automobile provided your automobile is insured fi 
Liability Coverage. 
2. SECTION II - LIABILITY COVERAGE does not apply to: 
a. any accident arising out of the operat ion of any: 
(1) crane, steam shovel or gas shovel; 
(2) di tch or trench digger; 
(3) a i r compressor, sandblast ing or building surface cleaning machinery, septic tank cleaning or vacuu 
c leaning equipment; 
(4) t ree or other spraying equipment; 
(5) we ld ing apparatus or wel l dri l l ing machinery; or 
(6) 
unless such operation is solely for the purpose of locomotion; or 
b. any bodily injury or property damage covered by insurance provided by any other policy, form or endorse 
ment. 
All other policy terms and conditions apply. 
POLLUTION LIABILITY EXCLUSION 
Automobile Policy 
t is agreed: 
SECTION II - LIABILITY COVERAGE does not apply to: 
I. Bodily injury or property damage resulting from the actual, alleged or threatened discharge, release, escape, 
seepage, migration, or dispersal of pollutants: 
a. that are, or are contained in any property that is: 
(1) being transported or towed by, handled or prepared for placement into or upon, or taken from the auto-
mobile; 
(2) otherwise in the course of transit by you or on your behalf; or 
(3) being disposed of, stored, treated or processed into or upon the automobile; 
b. before such pollutants or property containing pollutants are moved from the place they are accepted by you 
or anyone acting on your behalf for placement into or onto the automobile; or 
c. after such pollutants or property containing pollutants are removed from the automobile to where they are 
delivered, disposed of or abandoned by you or anyone acting in your behalf. 
1.a. above does not apply to pollutants that are needed or result from the normal mechanical, electrical or hy-
draulic functioning of the automobile or its parts, if the discharge, release, escape, seepage, migration or dis-
persal of such pollutants is directly from a part of the automobile designed to hold, store, receive or dispose of 
such pollutants by the automobile manufacturer. 
1.b. and I.e. above do not apply, if as a direct result of the maintenance or use of the automobile, pollutants or 
property containing pollutants which are not in or upon the automobile, are upset, overturned or damaged at any 
premises not owned by or leased to you. The discharge, release, escape, seepage, migration or dispersal of the 
pollutants must be directly caused by such upset, overturn or damage. 
Any loss, cost or expense arising out of any: 
a. request, demand or order that you or anyone else test for, monitor, clean up, remove, contain, treat, detoxify 
or neutralize, or in any way respond to, or assess the effects of pollutants; or 
b. claim or suit by or on behalf of a governmental authority for damages because of testing for, monitoring, 
cleaning up, removing, containing, treating, detoxifying or neutralizing, or in any way responding to, or as-
sessing the effects of pollutants. 
illutants means any solid, liquid, gaseous or thermal irritant or contaminant, including smoke, vapor, soot, fumes, 
ids, alkalis, chemicals, liquids, gases and waste. Waste materials include materials to be recycled, reconditioned 
reclaimed. 
other policy terms and conditions apply. 
N E W L , ACQUIRED AUTOMOBILE COVcRAGE 79540
 ( w 
Automobile Policy 
It is agreed: 
-f. COVERAGE 
Provided all automobiles you own that are licensed for use on public roadways, except any that are out of servic 
because of mechanical breakdown or damage sustained in an accident, are scheduled in the Declarations on tl" 
inception date of the current policy term, we will extend: 
a. Liability Coverage; 
b. Comprehensive Coverage; 
c. Collision Coverage; 
d. Uninsured Motorist Coverage and Underinsured Motorist Coverage; 
e. Automobile Medical Payments or any mandatory no-fault insurance coverages; 
as provided for those scheduled automobiles to any additional automobile you acquire during the current polic 
term. The extension applies only for the remainder ofthe current policy term. 
2. CONDITIONS 
The following conditions apply to this coverage extension in addition to those contained in SECTION VI - GEh 
ERAL CONDITIONS of the policy. 
a. Comprehensive Coverage is extended only if it applies to all automobiles scheduled in the Declarations o 
the inception date of the current policy term. We shall reduce our payment by $100 fgr each claim made wit 
respect to each automobile covered by this endorsement. 
b. Collision Coverage is extended only if it applies to all automobiles scheduled in the Declarations on the ir 
ception date of the current policy term. We shall reduce our payment by $250 for each claim made with re 
spect to each automobile covered by this endorsement. 
c. If a claim is made under this endorsement, you shall be charged the appropriate premium for the automobil 
involved in the loss. The premium charge shall be made from the date you acquired the automobile throug 
the end of the current policy term. 
d. We may examine and audit your books and records to determine the premium for this coverage at any time 
(1) during the policy term; and 
(2) within one year after the expiration of this insurance. 
e. You shall report all additional automobiles to us within 30 days following the expiration of each policy term 
f. We shall compute the actual earned premium for each policy term on a pro-rata basis determined by th 
number of additional automobiles you acquire during the current policy term. 
All other policy terms and conditions apply. 
